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ABSTRACT
SU, EMILY M. Hospital merger and acquisition effects on healthcare quality and cost.
Department of Economics, June 2017.
ADVISOR: PROFESSOR DOUGLASS KLEIN

Healthcare is as much a business subject to market dynamics as it is a public
service, with enormous sums of money and resources devoted to it. Since a person’s
health is one of his or her most valuable assets, healthcare will always be in high demand,
regardless of the price of medical goods and services. Considering healthcare’s nature as
a necessary good and the irreplaceable importance of a medical facility to its service area,
any changes in capacity or method of healthcare delivery may have profound effects on
the dependent population.
Situations in which a hospital merges with a healthcare system or another hospital
exemplify such a change, for mergers entail potentially large-scale alterations to the local
healthcare market and to the manner in which care is provided. The number of hospital
mergers and acquisitions has been steadily increasing since 2003, with the number of
deals growing over 40 percent from 2010 to 2015.
A concern is that larger institutions or systems wield greater market power and
may gain the ability to control the majority of healthcare delivery in the local area; this
decrease in competition can lead to rising costs without comparable improvements in
quality. On the other hand, consolidations can also present the opportunity for better
integration and efficiency of care, more abundant and valuable technological resources,
elimination of duplicate services, collaboration among more adept healthcare providers,

Su iii
and overall cost savings from economies of scale. This study explores the effects of
hospital consolidation and resultant operational changes on patient outcomes and the
costs associated with their care. Furthermore, the effect of hospital ownership status on
quality and cost measures will also be assessed. This thesis differs from existing literature
because it is the first known study to use hospital-level data from 2010 to 2014 to analyze
whether hospital mergers significantly affect healthcare quality and cost.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Hospital administrators involved in mergers believe that hospital consolidation
poses many benefits to not only the business and operations facet of medicine but also the
direct line provision of healthcare service. They argue that mergers improve efficiency as
well as access to and quality of care. Additionally, healthcare costs may decrease because
in theory, the more care a hospital provides, the more efficient and less expensive it
should become through economies of scale and scope; better access to skilled healthcare
professionals and medical technologies should improve care delivery overall and
ultimately benefit patient outcomes (Curfman, 2015; Ferrier and Valdmanis, 2004; Harris
et al., 2000).
Despite the appeal of the consolidation business decision to the entities directly
involved in the transaction, many health economists, rival hospitals, and healthcare
consumers are rightfully wary of the growing number of hospital mergers. When
individual hospitals merge into larger systems, their growing patient base and market
share give them greater leverage over health insurance companies for higher
reimbursement rates. These higher prices, in turn, fall to consumers in the form of higher
premiums. Therefore, from the patient perspective, mergers may be unfavorable because
of their potential to drive up healthcare costs (Curfman, 2015; Ferrier and Valdmanis,
2004; Harris et al., 2000).
The issue of hospital mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been debated for
years because they carry different costs and benefits for different constituents. Amidst the
perpetual effort toward healthcare quality improvement and cost reduction consequent the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, hospital,
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health system, and hospital association leaders have contended that healthcare reform
compels them to consolidate. On the other hand, others argue that mergers will, above all
else, result in increased prices. As a result, merging hospitals continue to face scrutiny
from healthcare providers and patients to prove the value of M&A deals and the benefits
they provide to consumers. It is of question whether the theoretically improved capacity
for procedural and clinical integration associated with mergers will actually come to
fruition, for healthcare institutions with dissimilar missions, cultures, and operational
structures may be unable to overcome the difficulties of achieving true assimilation of
services. In light of these obstacles, however, integration strategies that capitalize on the
distinct capabilities of the merging entities have been found to be successful; merging
assets to maximize collaborative opportunities, to increase quality of care through greater
available resources and expertise, and to contain costs via economies of scale will lead to
more efficient, reliable, and accessible healthcare goods and services (Barnet et al.,
2014).
Though there has been some distinction made in previous literature between local
multi-hospital systems and local mergers – the former of which involves two or more
hospitals that maintain separate physical facilities, do business under separate licenses,
and keep separate financial records, and the latter of which involves two or more
hospitals that do business under a single license, report unified financial records, and may
or may not consolidate some physical facilities – both consolidations between health
systems and hospitals as well as mergers between two individual hospitals will be
considered (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003).
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The remainder of this thesis will analyze the various costs and benefits
accompanying both such M&A transactions in further detail. The organization of the
ensuing discussion is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current
healthcare industry and hospital consolidation trends. Chapter 3 is a literature review on
hospital mergers and their effects on healthcare quality and cost. Chapter 4 introduces the
statistical model to be tested and describes the data that will be used, followed by the
results of the model in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will then discuss the results of the previous
chapter in a broader healthcare context. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a
summary of important findings and provides recommendations and implications for
further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND ON THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
The medical industry comprises a robust collection of sectors that provide
curative, preventive, rehabilitative, and palliative care to ailing patients. Considering the
necessity of and increasing demand for its goods and services, healthcare is one of the
world’s largest and fastest-growing industries. Medical expenditures in the United States
alone stood at $3.2 trillion in 2015, accounting for 17.8 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) (Appendix A). Of the $3.9 trillion allocated for federal spending in 2016, $588
billion was spent on Medicare and $368 billion on Medicaid (Appendix B). In 2014
Medicare and Medicaid spending comprised 20 percent and 16 percent of total national
healthcare expenditures, respectively, while private health insurance spending and out-ofpocket spending made up 33 percent and 11 percent of the total. Additionally, hospital
expenditures, physician and clinical services expenditures, and prescription drug
spending all experienced greater growth rates relative to those in 2013. Households and
the federal government together sponsored the majority of total health spending in 2014
(54 percent), private businesses accounted for 20 percent, state and local governments for
17 percent, and finally other private revenues for 7 percent (Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services). Since medical expenditures consume over 10 percent of GDP in
most developed countries, healthcare can represent an enormous part of a nation’s
economy (The Commonwealth Fund) (Appendix C).
In response to this perpetually growing demand for and cost of healthcare, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 2010 to provide
consumers more affordable, accessible, and higher quality healthcare services. With more
complete realization of its provisions in 2014, the ACA requires insurers to accept all
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applicants, cover a specific list of conditions, and charge the same rates regardless of preexisting conditions or sex. Additionally, inaugurating a Patient’s Bill of Rights has
allowed consumers greater control of their care, a capacity facilitated by coverage
expansions and premium subsidies (Health and Human Services). Furthermore, for 2015
to 2025, medical spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.8 percent per year,
1.3 percentage points faster than GDP (Appendix D). For 2015 to 2016, continued
enrollment growth in Medicaid and the marketplaces as well as enrollment increases in
employer-sponsored plans have substantially reduced the uninsured population without
drastically changing the growth rate in health spending. However, this growth is expected
to accelerate and average 5.7 percent for 2017 through 2019 as a result of gradual
increases in economy-wide and medical-specific prices; moreover, greater household
disposable income will likely contribute to rising healthcare costs consequent higher use
and intensity of medical goods and services. Finally, projected average growth surges to
6.0 percent for 2020 to 2025 due to strong Medicare enrollment growth amongst baby
boomers and an increasingly higher share of Medicaid beneficiaries comprising
comparatively aged and disabled individuals. Thus, by 2025, over one-fifth of the
country’s expenses will be attributed to medical care (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services).
A wide variety of healthcare institutions offer goods and services throughout the
U.S., and all operate slightly differently in compliance with federal regulations and in
response to local market dynamics. In 2014 the American Hospital Association (AHA)
registered 5,627 U.S. hospitals, which include nongovernment not-for-profit community
hospitals, investor-owned for-profit community hospitals, state and local government
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community hospitals, federal government hospitals, nonfederal psychiatric hospitals,
nonfederal long term care hospitals, and hospital units of institutions. In addition to these
categorizations, hospitals are also indexed according to their location and affiliation with
other healthcare entities. Approximately 54.6 percent and 33.0 percent of all registered
hospitals are in urban and rural communities, respectively, and a majority of hospitals
belong to a system (56.6 percent) compared to a network (28.8 percent); a system is
either a multihospital or a diversified single hospital system, and a network involves a
group of hospitals, physicians, other providers, insurers and/or community agencies that
collectively coordinate and deliver a broad spectrum of services to their community.
Altogether, annual expenses in 2014 for all AHA registered hospitals totaled to nearly $9
billion (American Hospital Association).
It is apparent that healthcare constitutes a considerable national expense in the
U.S., and its projected growth will continue to outpace GDP growth and eventually make
healthcare costs unsustainable. Even with the passage of federal policies aimed at
healthcare reform, the constant goal of reducing medical expenditures while improving
care access and quality remains elusive. Since hospitals are both service and business
entities, they may choose to engage in transactions, such as consolidation deals, to
increase their capacity to provide better care with more available resources and efficient
processes.
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CHAPTER THREE
A REVIEW OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON
HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND COST
In light of growing strategic, economic, and regulatory pressures, one of the most
prevalent trends in today’s dynamic healthcare industry involves hospital consolidation to
form larger systems capable of capitalizing on broader service reach and economics of
scale (Yanci et al., 2013). Existing literature analyzes an array of merger predispositions
and ramifications and discusses many factors that drive the business decision as well as
resulting quality and cost outcomes.

3.A. Macro level of hospital consolidation and competition
Before considering the direct effects of mergers on the particular entities involved
in the transaction, it is important to examine the consequences on the local healthcare
markets as a whole. Hospital consolidation may seem favorable from a broader
perspective of increased capital and resources, but its effect on industry competition and
market power may significantly alter the quality of care delivery and cost to patients.

3.A.1. Arguments for hospital consolidation
Advocates for hospital consolidation argue that mergers provide the opportunity
to share clinical services and resources, capitalize on economies of scale, eliminate
duplication, and ultimately improve healthcare quality without increasing cost (Chang et
al, 2016; Connor et al., 1997; Frakt, 2015; Xu et al., 2015). High-volume institutions are
more likely to benefit from increased operational efficiency and cost savings associated
with economies of scale; reducing unused capacity through pooled staffing and
eliminating duplicative services place merged entities in a better financial position with
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more streamlined and effective production processes (Connor et al., 1997; Hayford,
2012). The resulting efficient and standardized operations as well as more experienced
healthcare providers, higher volumes of specialized procedures can yield better surgical
outcomes (Connor et al., 1997). Merged facilities can also share high-performing
infrastructure resources like electronic medical records (EMRs) and have better access to
a greater range and amount of capital (Chang et al., 2016; Connor et al., 1997).
Additionally, mergers may be accompanied by attainment of not only physical capital but
also human capital as larger, more capable medical facilities attract increasingly skilled
professionals and garner greater patient bases from broader geographic and network
coverage (Alexander et al., 1996; Connor et al., 1997). Financial gains through merges
strengthen the capacity to invest substantially in quality-improvement health technology
and personnel (Alexander et al., 1996; Tsai and Jha, 2014). Even though greater
resources may not be invested in quality improvements, they are unlikely to reduce
quality; thus, the financial impact of a merger on quality should be, at worst, neutral
(Hayford, 2012).

3.A.2. Effects of competition on the healthcare industry
While proponents of hospital consolidation contend that efficient integration of
care and economies of scale drive quality improvement and cost reduction, a decrease in
competition consequent mergers has been shown to have opposite effects (Chang et al.,
2016; Frakt, 2015). Isolating the effect of reduced competition on quality of care has
revealed an increase in the number of procedures but also an increase in inpatient
mortality (Hayford, 2012).
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In a competitive market, providers must always strive to outperform their rivals in
order to attract patients. Therefore, the presence of competition provides a strong drive to
improve quality of services. Furthermore, healthy competition among providers for
inclusion in a network’s patient base enables insurers to negotiate lower reimbursement
rates, which translate to lower insurance costs for consumers and employers (Ramirez,
2014). There has also been evidence suggesting that hospitals in competitive markets
tend to have better management, possibly because poor management is associated with
more substantial costs (Tsai and Kha, 2014).
It is not to say that partnership between healthcare entities to any degree adversely
affects; most of the leading quality and safety successes in medicine, such as the
implementation of the World Health Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist and
near elimination of bloodstream infections in hospitals, have resulted from hospital
collaborations. However, these were collaboratives formed by competing hospitals rather
than within one system under common ownership (Xu et al., 2015).

3.A.3. Local hospital market dynamics
In addition to analyzing the prevalence of competition, it is important to consider
other dynamics of the healthcare markets in which mergers occur. The geographic and
economic natures of merging entities are also relevant considerations because crossmarket mergers have been shown to differ from within-market mergers, controlling for
commonalities shared across both merger types like changes in bargaining skill,
managerial practices, service mix, and cost structures (Dafny, 2016). Within a market,
merged facilities appear to retain most of their market share several years after the
merger, and zip codes with larger shares of patients who are discharged by merged
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facilities are affected proportionally to their share (Hayford, 2012). The identities of the
medical institutions present in the market also influence how these entities interact and
how mergers affect healthcare costs.
Merger-related price reductions have been found to be considerably less in market
areas with higher market concentration levels, and such reductions in areas with higher
health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration were approximately twice those in
areas with lower HMO penetration (Connor et al., 1997). Furthermore, consolidations
may alter the competitive dynamics of local healthcare markets, pressuring rival hospitals
to improve their quality of care to increase their competitive advantage against growing
hospital systems and to retain bargaining power with insurance companies (Chang et al.,
2016). Although surrounding hospitals may be compelled to reform their healthcare
practices in attempt to remain competitive, the merged entity itself may adopt a degree of
stagnating complacency. Larger, post-merger systems or hospitals may be less motivated
to join health information exchanges, which allow for the meaningful data sharing,
systems for effective patient handoffs, and streamlined care transitions, because they
assume they already capture a large proportion of patients’ clinical information
internally; they may see information as a tool to retain patients, not to improve care (Tsai
and Jha, 2014). Moreover, conglomerate hospitals created from mergers have the
potential to wield considerable market power and to make decisions regarding the care
offerings for a large patient population.
The absence of robust competition may incentivize such hospitals to focus on the
most profitable services rather than to maintain the infrastructure for a fuller range of
services or to pursue continuous quality improvement. These actions present risk to a
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population if a monopoly hospital system within a market fails; population health would
suffer, and greater threat endangers rural areas where one hospital system serves as the
only source of medical care (Xu et al., 2015). Therefore, it is essential to consider not
only the benefits of greater operational capacity consequent consolidation but also the
potential harm that can follow if merged hospitals become powerful enough in their
markets such that their priorities shift away from improving patient care to other, less
altruistic goals.

3.B. Hospital characteristics
Hospital type and other general characteristics can affect the likelihood of a
merge, structural and operational changes subsequent consolidation, and how mergers
impact healthcare quality and cost. Furthermore, the number of patients, capable
physicians, and overall volume of procedures in a hospital are important determinants of
the ability to deliver appropriate care with improvements in patient outcomes paralleling
decreases in costs.

3.B.1. Hospital size and ownership type
Connor, et al (1997) found that merging hospitals were less likely to have been
government-owned and more likely to have been part of a system, were larger in terms of
numbers of beds and admissions, had higher occupancy rates and case-mix indexes, and
had higher expenses and revenues per adjusted admission. Despite the perception of
mergers as an eventuality of one or two hospitals that do not have the resources to
function optimally independently, little evidence suggests that smaller institutions cannot
make the investments needed to improve care delivery. Small hospitals are comparable
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with larger ones in adopting new health information technology, for example, and many
quality improvement interventions, like checklists, are inexpensive and can be
successfully implemented with strong leadership and commitment (Tsai and Jha, 2014).
Size has been found to have post-merger ramifications, for mergers between hospitals of
dissimilar size have resulted in a decrease in the number of beds in the new facility and
an increase in both the nurses and total personnel per average daily census, changes that
could possibly have helped ameliorate staffing shortages present in the pre-merged
hospitals (Alexander et al., 1996).
Hospital ownership has been found to play a role in affecting quality and cost of
care. Horwitz et al. (2005) found that the medical services hospitals provide vary
markedly by ownership depending on their differing priorities; proprietary hospitals are
more likely to offer relatively profitable services, government hospitals are most likely to
offer relatively unprofitable services that are disproportionately needed by poor and
underinsured patients, and nonprofit hospitals fall in between by balancing profit-seeking
and serving the poor. An example of this phenomenon is the observation that among
comparable hospitals, for-profits are the most likely to offer open-heart surgery above
nonprofits and then public hospitals, sequentially (Horwitz, 2005).
Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are privately owned and operated and thus may
have greater access to resources than publicly-owned government hospitals. A
phenomenon known as the “infrastructure inequality trap” represents when government
funding is increasingly attracted towards private hospitals and away from public hospitals
because private patients can afford to pay for greater infrastructure at private hospitals.
As a result, private hospitals have a greater capacity to accept more government funds
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and skilled healthcare personnel to promote healthcare quality improvement (Basu et al.,
2012). Akinci et al. (2005) also underlines the importance of physical appearance and
technological capabilities in patient perceptions of hospital competence.
Between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, however, the majority of the studies
that have analyzed healthcare data representative of U.S. hospitals have found that forprofit hospitals tend to have higher mortality or other adverse event rates than nonprofit
hospitals. On average, for-profit hospitals have been found to have higher mortality
among elderly patients with heart disease (McClellan and Staiger, 2000). On the other
hand, it can be speculated that for-profit hospitals may provide higher quality care on
easily monitored dimensions that are critical for determining reimbursement amounts but
pay less attention to harder-to-monitor quality measures (Sloan et al., 2001). Amidst the
various findings, it has also been concluded that hospital ownership does not make an
apparent difference in quality outcomes, such as readmission rate to a hospital for the
same diagnosis and mortality rates several months after discharge (McClellan and
Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001).
When analyzing how ownership status impacts patient’s perceived quality of
hospital care, as opposed to examining the differences in actual patient health outcomes
measures, hospital ownership does seem to have various effects different from those
discussed previously on mortality and readmission rates. Since nonprofit and government
hospitals do not place primary emphasis on earning a net profit, it is not uncommon for
news of their high debt-to-asset ratios to shape consumer opinions in the media (Sloan et
al., 2003). Consumers, therefore, form views that nonprofit and government hospitals
have poor competence and that for-profit hospitals are better coordinated, have shorter
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wait times, and more streamlined clinical pathways in order to minimize waste and
maximize profit (Drevs et al., 2014). Proprietary hospitals, however, also suffer from
perceptions of a conflict of interest because they provide healthcare goods and services
while also aiming to make a profit. To address this discord between economic and
altruistic strategic goals, for-profit hospitals sometimes affiliate with social causes or
welfare initiatives (Lichtenstein et al., 2004).
Beyond competence, the level of comfort and perception of affectionate care
afforded by a hospital to its patients are also crucial determinants of patient satisfaction
that vary with ownership type. Nonprofit hospitals tend to score the highest in humane,
fair, and personalized care (Schlesinger et al., 2004a; Schlesinger et al., 2004b). Forprofit hospitals are not perceived well with regard to these considerations because
consumers may feel as though they are not treated as individuals but as cases. Proprietary
hospitals’ principal focus on cost-reduction strategies, profit margins, and efficiency can
convey a view of patient care as simply increasing volume and throughput (Comondore
et al., 2009). Some for-profit hospitals have strived to eliminate this negative perception
of lack of care for individualized patient needs by implementing customer relationship
management programs (Akinci et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2008). Therefore, the different
priorities and available resources of each of the three hospital types may have a more
significant effect on shaping patient perceptions and satisfaction of care than on the
actual outcomes measures themselves.

3.B.2. Hospital and surgeon volume of operative procedures
Consolidation almost invariably entails increases in hospital and surgeon volume
for acquired hospitals due to a more expansive patient base, provider workforce, and
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institutional capacity. As a result, healthcare quality is likely to be higher in medical
facilities consequent a merger because high-volume hospitals may have more surgeons
who specialize in specific procedures, more consistent processes for postoperative care,
better-staffed intensive care units (ICUs), and greater resources, in general to handle
postoperative complications (Birkmeyer et al., 2002). There is considerable evidence that
patients undergoing various types of complex treatments or high-risk surgical procedures
have lower mortality rates and otherwise better outcomes if care is provided in hospitals
with a high caseload of patients with the same condition (Hayford, 2012; Kizer, 2003).
For instance, hospital mergers are associated with increased utilization of intensive heart
surgeries and greater treatment intensity, both in the type of treatment utilized and in the
number of procedures received during a hospital stay (Hayford, 2012). For most
conditions other than a small number of technically difficult surgeries like
esophagectomy and pancreatectomy, however, the benefits of volume may be less
pronounced; volume effects usually diminish past a critical threshold that most hospitals
already reach for many procedures. Emerging evidence suggests that volume may simply
be a proxy for other processes, such as having systems well-adept to recognize and
effectively manage complications (Tsai and Kha, 2014).
In addition to increases in overall hospital volume for surgical procedures,
surgeon volume and the average experience of operating surgeons also increase due to
greater staffing capabilities and employment appeal following a merger. A larger surgeon
team with more expertise is much more likely to improve patient surgical outcomes, and
patients treated by high-volume surgeons have been shown to have lower operative
mortality rates than those cared for by low-volume surgeons, regardless of the surgical
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volume of the hospital in which they practiced (Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Kizer, 2003).
Surgeon volume was found to be inversely related to operative mortality for eight
cardiovascular or cancer resection procedures, and for certain types of such procedures,
patients could significantly increase their chances of survival by selecting surgeons who
perform the operations frequently (Kizer, 2003). The adjusted odds ratio for operative
death varies widely according to the procedure, and surgeon volume accounts for a large
proportion of the apparent effect of hospital volume (Birkmeyer et al., 2003).

3.C. Quality measures
One of the chief considerations in healthcare is patient quality outcomes and
satisfaction scores, for medicine is ultimately a service for the good of the public.
Therefore, there is pressure on merging entities to be able to justify the transaction with
improving scores on various quality measures.

3.C.1. Mortality, complication, and readmission rates
Mortality and readmission rates represent two hallmarks of healthcare quality, and
much research has focused on surgical outcomes measures. Although increases in volume
that arise from consolidation have been seen to have positive effects on surgical mortality
rates, the overall consequences of mergers on healthcare quality are mixed. Previous
research on the effects of hospital mergers on certain procedures revealed inconsistent
changes in risk-adjusted complication rate; lumbar and lumbosacral fusion of the
posterior column and total hip replacement saw decreases in risk-adjusted complication
rate; transurethral prostatectomy, cervical fusion of the anterior column, and total knee
replacement experienced increased rates; and laparoscopic colectomy and lumbar and
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lumbosacral fusion of the anterior column saw no change in complication rate.
Furthermore, the comorbidity rate of obesity for patients of consolidated hospitals was
found to be greater post-consolidation (Chang et al., 2016). Additionally, to contrast the
decreased adjusted mortality rates found for selected cardiovascular and cancer
procedures discussed previously, merger completion is also associated with increased
utilization of bypass surgery and angioplasty as well as increased inpatient mortality
(Hayford, 2012).
Previous studies have also researched the extent to which mortality and
readmission rates are related. Some existing literature has found a modest association
between 30-day mortality and readmission rates for heart failure (Krumholz et al., 2013;
McIlvennan et al., 2015). Krumholz et al. (2013) found that risk-standardized mortality
and readmission rates were not associated for patients admitted for heart attack or
pneumonia and were only weakly, negatively associated for patients admitted with heart
failure. Another study by Ho and Hamilton (2000) compared the quality of hospital care
before and after mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995 and found
no measurable impact on inpatient AMI mortality and increased AMI 90-day readmission
rates in some cases.
Finally, though mergers allow for financial savings due to infrastructure
consolidation, some patients may be required to travel farther for care. Additional travel
time, even in urban or hospital-dense areas, has been found to increase mortality from
myocardial infarctions (Hayford et al., 2012). Therefore, hospital consolidation does not
seem to uniformly impact postoperative mortality or readmission rates.
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3.C.2. Patient satisfaction scores
Patient experience of care has also become an important consideration in
evaluating healthcare quality. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS)
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS)
provides a national, standardized survey instrument and data collection methodology for
measuring patients’ perspectives on hospital care. This survey allows for valid
comparisons to be made across all hospitals in the U.S. (HCAHPS Hospital Survey). One
of the HCAHPS global measures, patients’ overall ratings of their hospitals, has been
positively associated with hospital performance on CMS clinical process of care
measures for AMI, HF, PN, and surgical care (Isaac et al., 2010; Jha et al., 2008).
Mortality and readmission rates conditions such as heart attack, heart failure, and
pneumonia have shown improvement consequent the start of public reporting and
inclusion of these measures in the CMS’s pay-for-performance (P4P) programs (Griffey
and Kosowsky, 2007; Price et al., 2014; Suter et al., 2014). Higher patient satisfaction has
been found to be associated with improved guideline adherence and lower risk-adjusted
inpatient mortality rates for heart attack patients (Glickman et al., 2010). Furthermore,
hospitals with the highest patient satisfaction scores have lower 30-day mortality and
readmission rates compared to hospitals with the lowest patient satisfaction scores (Tsai
et al., 2015). Finally, it is not only outcomes metrics that play a role in determining
patient experience but also process of care measures. Hospitals with consistently poor
performance on cardiac process measures have also been found to possess lower patient
satisfaction on average, an association suggesting that these hospitals have overall poor
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quality of care (Girotra et al., 2012). Research on the effects of hospital mergers on
HCAHPS scores is limited, and no conclusive evidence from multiple studies has
suggested any significant impacts.

3.D. Healthcare cost
Medical expenditures comprise a relatively large proportion of the country’s
GDP, and containing its rapid growth is one of the nation’s primary concerns. Whether
M&A transactions result in increased or decreased costs is still a topic of contention, and
assessing the effects of mergers on the operational performance of the involved entities is
important to consider.

3.D.1. Costs
Similar to quality, healthcare costs have also experienced variable impacts as a
result of hospital mergers. In instances in which lesser performing hospitals consolidate
through a merger or acquisition, the act can allow for cost savings, increased market
power, and economies of scale (Chang et al., 2016). Moreover, merger-related price
reductions have been found to be greater for low-occupancy hospitals, nonteaching
hospitals, non-system hospitals, similar-size hospitals, and hospitals with greater premerger service duplication (Connor et al., 1997).
Despite these findings, many studies have shown the opposite effect that hospital
consolidation raises prices upwards of 45 percent with little to no corresponding
improvements in quality (Dafny, 2014; Gaynor and Town, 2012; Ramirez, 2014; Xu et
al., 2015). In considering the rival distance to merged entities, there has also been
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evidence indicating substantial post-merger price increases by rivals of merging hospitals
(Dafny, 2005). Price increases may arise through two mechanisms in settings in which a
single payer negotiates with both providers. The common customer effect is generated
when the insurer competes for customers who value both merging providers, and the
common insurer effect exists even in the absence of common customers. Cross-market
mergers in the same state resulted in price increases of roughly 6 to 10 percent, while
those linking hospitals to out-of-state providers did not result in statistically meaningful
changes in price; mergers of proximate hospitals may lead to the largest price effects
(Dafny et al., 2016). The majority of existing literature seems to suggest higher
healthcare costs as a result of hospital mergers.

3.D.2. Hospital operating efficiency
Incongruent with the substantial support for higher prices without compensating
benefits

consequent

hospital

consolidation,

mergers

may

produce

short-term

improvements in operating efficiency on measures such as the number of duplicate tests
and the regional variation in medical practice (Quality Forum). For all merger types,
operational areas such as operating efficiency, occupancy rate, and expenses per adjusted
admissions were all positively impacted, and trends toward inefficiency were arrested
somewhat after merger (Alexander et al., 1996). Additionally, because mergers often
create avenues whereby to consolidate two small clinical departments into one larger
unit, they can reduce the relative variability of daily patient census as well as the
associated costs of staffing adequately for random periods of high demand (Lynk, 1995).
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3.E. Concerns regarding mergers
Since mergers continue to occur amidst the debates regarding its different costs
and benefits depending on the constituents in question, third party institutions have some
control over the outcome of consolidation propositions; these organizations strive to
make objective decisions about merger deals after taking into account their possible
effects on both the macro and micro scale.
3.E.1. Hazards of mergers
The main potential hazards of mergers to parties other than the consolidating
hospitals or hospital systems are decreased competition, higher prices, and reduced
geographic access because of consolidation (Connor et al., 1997). Even though there has
been some evidence suggesting that mergers reduce costs, improve healthcare quality,
and increase operational efficiency, many of these benefits can be achieved without
consolidation. The volume-quality relation of better health outcomes with higher
numbers of procedures as well as better triaging of patients to the best physician can be
addressed through interoperability of EHRs and better transparency. Proliferation of large
hospital systems in low-competition marketplaces may fail to improve outcomes and also
could encourage greater health care utilization that may drive up costs and induce
iatrogenic illness. Furthermore, infrastructure consolidation may require some patients to
travel farther for care, resulting in more intensive procedures and higher mortality.
Finally, hospitals that own expensive equipment, such as radiation machines, are more
likely to refer patients for in-system treatment over other treatment options, leading to
potentially more suboptimal care and overtreatment in large health systems (Xu et al.,
2015).
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3.E.2. Antitrust organizations
Considering the dangers associated with hospital consolidations, antitrust
organizations can be justifiably concerned that mergers in concentrated markets will
erode competition, increase prices, and reduce consumer welfare (Connor et al., 1997;
Dafny, 2014). Antitrust laws play a crucial role in ensuring that consumers benefit from
robust market competition. Such necessary competition leads to lower costs and higherquality services and encourages investment and innovation. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) intervenes when there is strong evidence that a merger between
healthcare providers is likely to result in market power that will cause an increase in
prices through higher insurance premiums and copayments without corresponding quality
improvements. The FTC showed that there are different ways other than a merger for
hospitals to achieve the benefits of clinical integration, such as the use of clinical practice
protocols to ensure consistent treatment and financial incentives for meeting quality-ofcare goals (Ramirez, 2014).
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CHAPTER 4
STATISTICAL MODEL: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS
Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis will be used to compare changes in riskadjusted complication rate of certain elective operations performed nationally one year
prior to consolidation (pre-consolidation) and the year after consolidation (postconsolidation) between the consolidated hospitals and the matched control group. Chang
et al. (2016) conducted a similar study with patient-level data from the Health Care Cost
and Utilization Project State Inpatient Database for California and Florida. They
identified 19 hospitals that consolidated between 2007 and 2013 and propensity matched
them with 19 independent hospitals, using patient and hospital characteristics. This study
will compare a sample of 20 merged hospitals from 2011, 8 merged hospitals from 2012,
and 16 merged hospitals from 2013 with a matching number of unmerged, control
hospitals from each corresponding year. Hospitals were matched according to number of
beds, and quality and cost data were obtained from 2010 to 2014.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND RESULTS
The main purpose of this study is to test whether a hospital merger or acquisition
has a significant impact on the target hospital’s patient outcomes and Medicare
reimbursements. Equation 1 was used for the basic DID analysis employing an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression in which quality outcomes were a function of three
dummy variables: AFTER, whether the quality data was from the year before or after that
of the merge; MERGED, the status of the hospital as merged or unmerged; and
AFTER*MERGED, the interaction term. These three independent variables were
included to analyze not only the individual effects of time and merger status on hospital
quality scores but also, most importantly, the combined effect of participation in a merger
deal on the quality of care provided over time.

OUTCOME = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + ε

(1)

This study uses data on hospital mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from Irving
Levin Associates, a company that has been providing market intelligence for healthcare
M&A markets for over 60 years (Irving Levin Associates). Irving Levin Associates is the
leading publisher of business intelligence for investors in healthcare M&A and finance,
and it is the most well-recognized and reliable source of catalogued hospital merger deals
in the nation. Information on 2011, 2012, and 2013 hospital M&As was obtained from
the comprehensive lists outlined in Irving Levin Associates’s annual The Health Care
Services Acquisition Reports. Data of interest comprised the target name, listing,
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location, and units, as well as the acquirer name, listing, and location. Terms of the deals
were also collected.
Analysis of healthcare quality metrics and costs involved panel data from CMS’S
Hospital Compare, an online database with information on quality of care and median
reimbursements provided by and to Medicare-certified hospitals throughout the U.S.
Datasets were obtained from the Hospital Compare data archive for 2010 to 2014, using
the most updated annual files available. Since this study aimed to analyze the changes in
patient outcomes from one year prior to the merge event to one year after, this five-year
span of quality data was necessary to encompass the three years of merger deals. Table 1
presents all of the variables utilized in the regression analyses along with their detailed
descriptions.

Table 1. Variable descriptions.
Variables
MORT_AMI
READM_AMI
MORT_HF
READM_HF
MORT_PN
READM_PN
HSP_9_10
REC_Y
GOVT
NONPROFIT

FORPROFIT

PAYM_AMI
PAYM_HF
PAYM_PN

Descriptions
30-day death rate for heart attack patients
30-day rate of unplanned readmission for heart attack patients
30-day death rate for heart failure patients
30-day rate of unplanned readmission for heart failure patients
30-day death rate for pneumonia patients
30-day rate of unplanned readmission for pneumonia patients
Percentage of patients who gave their hospital a rating of 9 or 10 on a
scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest)
Percentage of patients who reported YES, they would definitely
recommend the hospital
Public hospital owned by a government and receives government funding
Private hospital owned by nonprofit corporations or religious
organizations that invests all profits in the organization and is
exempt from paying income and property taxes
Private hospital owned by corporates or individuals that distributes
profits to investors, raises capital through investors, and pays
income and property taxes
Median Medicare payment for heart attack patients, discharged alive with
MCC (MS-DRG 280)
Median Medicare payment for heart failure patients, discharged alive
with MCC (MS-DRG 291)
Median Medicare payment for pneumonia patients, discharged alive with
MCC (MS-DRG 193)

Note: The descriptions are taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s data dictionaries and cms.gov.
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Hospitals for the merged hospital sample were randomly selected by taking every
fifth deal listed in the Irving Levin Associates annual reports. Then, the target hospitals
were located in the Hospital Compare dataset for the corresponding year of the merge,
the year before, and the year after to ensure data availability. If data were missing for any
of the eight quality measures, the next deal in the list was taken until a sample with
complete data was compiled. To create the control sample of comparable hospitals that
did not undergo a merge or acquisition, the hospitals in the merged sample were matched
according to number of beds (units) and state to control hospitals listed in the American
Hospital Directory (American Hospital Directory). Meticulous care was taken in
selecting comparable hospitals for the control group such that the mean number of units
was only different by one – 236 beds in the merged hospitals and 237 in the unmerged
hospitals. The full sample used contains 20 merged hospitals from 2011, 8 merged
hospitals from 2012, and 16 merged hospitals from 2013, with a matching number of
unmerged, control hospitals from each corresponding year. Data on all the variables in
Table 1 were obtained for hospitals in both samples for the year prior to and after the
merge date of the merged hospital in each merged-unmerged hospital matched pair.
Data for variables that could potentially have an impact on healthcare outcomes
were collected from Hospital Compare’s databases. The quality metrics selected were 30day acute myocardial infarction (AMI, i.e. heart attack) mortality rate, AMI readmission
rate, heart failure (HF) mortality rate, HF readmission rate, pneumonia (PN) mortality
rate, and PN readmission rate. The mortality measures are estimates of deaths for any
reason in the 30 days after either entering the hospital for a specific condition or having a
coronary artery bypass graft surgery; the deaths can occur in the hospital or after
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discharge. The readmission measures are estimates of unplanned readmission for any
reason to an acute care hospital in the 30 days after discharge from a hospitalization. Allcause mortality and readmissions are considered because from a patient perspective, any
death or readmission is an adverse event. Both death and readmission rates are measured
within 30 days because deaths and readmissions after a longer time period may have less
to do with the care received in the hospital and more to do with other complicating
illnesses, patients’ own behavior, or care provided to patients after hospital discharge.
The death and readmission measures include hospitals for Medicare beneficiaries 65
years or older, and the readmission measures do not include patients who died during the
index admission or who left the hospital against medical advice. Furthermore, to
accurately compare hospital performance, the death and readmission rates are adjusted
for patient characteristics that may make death or readmission more likely. These
characteristics include the patient’s age, past medical history, and comorbidities upon
admission that are known to increase the patient’s chance of dying or of having a
readmission (Medicare.gov). The readmission and mortality rates for AMI, HF, and PN
were each regressed on the three dummy variables using Equation 1.
The three conditions of AMI, HF, and PN were chosen because they were
included in the Joint Commission’s initial set of core performance measures in 2001.
Hospitals seeking accreditation were required to submit data on these standardized
measure sets. Moreover, CMS and the Joint Commission collaborated on the AMI, HF,
and PN measures to align the specifications that were common to both and subsequently
set out to make their measure sets identical with common data dictionaries, information
forms, and algorithms (Joint Commission Specifications Manual). With increasing
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emphasis on P4P and value-based purchasing (VBP), especially consequent the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), CMS requires hospitals to submit data on
AMI, HF, and PN and provides financial incentives and bonuses for measurable
improvements in overall score on these quality measures (Griffey and Kosowsky, 2007).
The next variable included as potentially affecting a hospital’s quality of care was
target hospital ownership. A hospital’s characterization as public or private and profitseeking or not-for-profit may drive different incentives that emphasize certain elements
of the care process for various reasons, but existing literature provides incongruous
results regarding the effects of hospital ownership on healthcare quality or whether the
ownership type has any significant impact at all. It has been found that for-profit
hospitals tend to have higher mortality rates than nonprofit hospitals, but for-profit
hospitals could also provide higher quality care on principal measures for reimbursement
(McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan et al., 2001). Even though no significant differences
in quality outcomes have been found pertaining to hospital ownership, previous studies
have not considered 30-day mortality rates that are more observable than mortality rates
after several months and 30-day readmission rates that represent unplanned readmissions
for any reason (McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001).
All of the hospitals in both the merged and unmerged samples belonged to one of
three hospital listings: government, voluntary nonprofit, and for-profit. Only two of the
three categories, government and for-profit, were given a dummy variable specification
and included in the regression to avoid multicollinearity in Equation 2. The nonprofit
listing was omitted from the OLS regression because it contained the majority of the
hospitals in the study, 73 percent, as shown in Table 3. The constant term represents the
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nonprofit hospitals, and the coefficients on the government and for-profit dummy
variables would show differences between hospitals of these two types and the majority
of hospitals in the market that identify as voluntary nonprofit.

OUTCOME = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT

(2)

+ β5FORPROFIT + ε

Previous literature has suggested associations between readmission and mortality
rates; hospitals with lower mortality rates may have been discharging patients who had a
greater severity of illness and thus a greater likelihood of being readmitted, or hospitals
with higher mortality rates could have had patients die before they could be readmitted
(Krumholz et al., 2013). Therefore, separate OLS tests were done with readmission rates
for AMI, HF, and PN regressed on the corresponding, condition-specific mortality rates
in addition to the five dummy variables, as seen in Equation 3. Again, the dummy
variable for nonprofit hospitals was left out of the regression to prevent multicollinearity
among the ownership variables.

READM_RATE = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT

(3)

+ β5FORPROFIT + β6MORT_RATE + ε

In addition to the six patient outcomes measures, two Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures were also
included in the study. Research indicates that higher patient satisfaction with their care
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experiences is associated with higher levels of adherence to recommended prevention and
treatment processes and better clinical outcomes. Furthermore, HCAHPS measures are
increasingly included in public reporting and P4P programs (Price et al., 2014). Patients’
overall ratings of their hospitals have been positively associated with hospital
performance on CMS clinical process of care measures for AMI, HF, PN, and surgical
care (Isaac et al., 2010; Jha et al., 2008). Additionally, overall ratings and willingness to
recommend the hospital were lower in hospitals that consistently performed poorly on
cardiac process measures (Girotra et al., 2012). Therefore, the global HCAHPS measures
of overall hospital rating and willingness to recommend hospital were included with
outcome measures on AMI, HF, and PN to provide a more comprehensive picture of
hospital quality of care.
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the six mortality and readmission
rates as well as the two global HCAHPS patient satisfaction measures. Not all 176
observations reported mortality and readmission rates for AMI. Average readmission
rates were higher than average mortality rates for all three conditions, with the greatest
difference between the two for HF, in which readmission rates were nearly twice
mortality rates. The range of each rate was also fairly wide. Overall, AMI had the highest
mean mortality rate and HF had the highest readmission rate. For the HCAHPS scores, a
slightly greater proportion of patients tended to report that they would recommend their
hospital than would rate the hospital a 9 or 10. Again, the range of values for both patient
satisfaction measures varied widely, for the maximum percentage of patients answering
affirmatively to these categories was twice or more than twice the minimum for hospital
rating and likelihood to recommend, respectively.

Su 31

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Hospital Compare mortality, readmission, and global HCAHPS quality measures.
Variables
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Number of Observations

MORT_AMI
15.6
15.2
29.0
10.4
2.8
175

READM_AMI
18.6
19.0
24.0
8.6
2.7
171

Note: Data taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s databases from 2010 to 2014.

MORT_HF
12.0
11.3
28.3
6.7
3.5
176

READM_HF
23.1
23.6
31.6
9.0
3.7
176

MORT_PN READM_PN
13.0
17.8
11.9
17.8
26.4
26.7
8.3
8.5
3.4
2.3
176
176

HSP_9_10
68.2
68.0
92.0
46.0
8.0
176

REC_Y
70.7
71.0
94.0
43.0
9.3
176
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With changes in healthcare cost also an important potential consequence of
hospital mergers, Hospital Compare data on median Medicare payment for three of the
top seventy utilized Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs) was
collected. One MS-DRG is assigned to each inpatient stay using the principal diagnosis
and additional diagnoses, the principal procedure and additional procedures, sex, and
discharge status. The three DRGs chosen belong to the three conditions under study and
comprise acute myocardial infarction patients discharged alive with major complication
or comorbidity (MCC) (MS-DRG 280); heart failure & shock patients with MCC (MSDRG 291); and simple pneumonia & pleurisy patients with MCC (MS-DRG 193). As
part of the hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), each of these MSDRGs has a payment weight assigned to it based on the average resources used to treat
Medicare patients in that MS-DRG. CMS uses MS-DRGs to better account for severity of
illness and resource consumption for Medical patients, and MCC represents the highest
level of severity. The IPPS per-discharge payment is based on two national base payment
rates, one that provides for operating expenses and the other for capital expenses. These
standardized payment rates are adjusted to account for the MS-DRG relative weight, or
the costs associated with the patient’s clinical condition and related treatment relative to
the costs of the average Medicare case, as well as the wage index, representing market
conditions in the hospitals’ location relative to national conditions. The same MS-DRG
weights are used for operating and capital payment rates and are recalibrated annually,
without affecting overall payments, based on standardized charges and costs for all IPPS
cases in each MS-DRG. Base operating and capital rates are adjusted by an area wage
index to reflect the expected differences in local market prices for labor, which is
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intended to measure difference in hospital wage rates among labor markets by comparing
the average hourly wage for hospital workers in each urban or statewide rural area to the
nationwide average. The wage index is revised each year based on wage data reported by
IPPS hospitals (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).
Beginning with discharges occurring on and after October 1, 2012, IPPS
payments also reflect any applicable adjustments under the Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP) Program and Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP).
Under the Hospital VBP Program, a portion of operating IPPS payments to acute
inpatient hospitals eligible for the program are reduced to fund value-based incentive
payments based on hospital overall performance on a set of quality measures. Under the
HRRP, a portion of eligible hospitals’ IPPS payments are reduced for those hospitals with
excess 30-day readmissions for conditions including AMI, HF, and PN. Finally, IPPS
payment has undergone another adjustment starting in fiscal year 2015 consequent the
Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HACs) Reduction Program, in which overall payments
are reduce by 1 percent for applicable hospitals in the worst-performing quartile of riskadjusted quality measures for reasonable preventable HACs (Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services).
Median Medicare payment was regressed on the three dummy variables in
Equation 4 to assess the effects of hospital merger events on healthcare costs over time.
These payment IDs were chosen because MS-DRG 193 was the only reimbursement
measure for PN in the 2010 Hospital Compare database, so it was carried through the
remaining years with the same measures for the other two conditions.
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MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + ε

(4)

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the three hospital ownership types and
the three Medicare payment measures. Fifteen percent of the total hospitals were public,
government-owned; 73 percent were private, voluntary nonprofit; and 11 percent were
for profit. Not all hospitals reported their median Medicare payments for the three MSDRGs under study. Of the individual samples that had data, the mean Medicare
reimbursements were highest for AMI patients discharged alive with MCC and lowest for
PN patients discharged alive with MCC. Each MS-DRG had a large range of payment
variation, with the maximum reimbursement nearly three times the minimum for AMI,
two times the minimum for HF, and over two times the minimum for PN.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for target hospital ownership and median Medicare payment measures.
Variables
GOVT
NONPROFIT
FORPROFIT
PAYM_AMI
0.15
0.73
0.11
11,529.54
Mean
0.00
1.00
0.00
11,104.50
Median
1.00
1.00
1.00
19,142.00
Maximum
0.00
0.00
0.00
6,941.00
Minimum
0.36
0.44
0.32
2,107.41
Std. Dev.
176
176
176
168
Number of Observations
Note: Data taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s databases from 2010 to 2014.

PAYM_HF
9,399.35
9,032.00
14,404.00
7,160.07
1,465.84
175

PAYM_PN
9,154.47
8,822.00
14,595.00
6,763.58
1,486.83
175

All hospitals must make a profit somehow in order to continue operations, but the
method whereby hospitals increase their revenue differs based on their ownership type.
Medical services hospitals provide vary markedly by ownership depending on their
differing priorities; proprietary hospitals are more likely to offer relatively profitable
services, government hospitals are most likely to offer relatively unprofitable services
that are disproportionately needed by poor and underinsured patients, and nonprofit
hospitals fall in between by balancing profit-seeking and serving the poor (Horwitz,
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2005). Therefore, differences in healthcare services offered may result in different
Medicare reimbursement amounts, so dummy variables for hospital ownership were
added to produce Equation 5.

MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT

(5)

+ β5FORPROFIT + ε

As the healthcare industry has increasingly evolved to value quality of care, initiatives
such as CMS’s inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) and Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP) Program reflect the significant role hospital performance has on
Medicare payments. Incentive payments are awarded under the VBP Program to
participating hospitals that meet or exceed performance standards and/or improve
performance during the applicable performance period (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services). Therefore, it was appropriate to test the effect of quality outcomes on
healthcare costs as well, as shown in Equation 6. The outcomes variable represents the
six mortality and readmission rates as well as the overall hospital rating. The likelihood
that a patient would definitely recommend a hospital was omitted from the OLS
regression because of the high correlation between both global HCAHPS measures of
0.92, as shown in Table 4. It was more appropriate to include only one of these measures
to avoid multicollinearity. Furthermore, overall hospital rating is the only HCAHPS
global measure included in Hospital VBP (HCAHPS Fact Sheet).
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MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED β4GOVT

(6)

+ β6FORPROFIT + β7OUTCOME + ε

Table 4 shows the correlation values between every possible pair of variables in
this study. AMI mortality is the only mortality rate that decreased over time without
taking into account the presence of a merger event. Average readmission rates and
median Medicare reimbursements for patients discharged alive with MCC also decreased
for all three conditions over time. The two global HCAHPS measures, furthermore,
showed an overall increase across each three-year period spanning a merger year. The
primary variable of interest, the interaction term AFTER*MERGED, shows a negative
relationship with readmission rates for all three conditions, median Medicare payment for
AMI, MS-DRG 280, and now patient likelihood to definitely recommend the hospital
after considering the effect of a merger over time. All three mortality rates are positively
associated with each other, and all three readmission rates are positively correlated with
each other as well. Moreover, the each mortality rate has a negative relationship with
readmission rate for all three conditions. AMI mortality rate is negatively associated with
overall hospital rating; likelihood to definitely recommend a hospital; and nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals. Government hospitals are negatively associated with AMI, HF, and
PN readmission rates as well as both HCAHPS measures. Nonprofit hospitals are
negatively associated with all three mortality rates and both patient satisfaction measures.
Finally, proprietary hospitals are positively correlated with HF mortality rates, PN
mortality and readmission rates, and both HCAHPS measures. Medicare payments for
AMI are negatively associated with the interaction term, while payments for HF and PN
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are positively associated with the interaction term. Medicare reimbursements for all three
conditions are positively correlated with government and nonprofit hospital types but
negatively correlated with for-profit hospitals.
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Table 4. Correlation values between all study variables.
AFTER

MERGED

AFTER*MERGED

MORT_AMI

READM_AMI

MORT_HF

READM_HF

MORT_PN

READM_PN

AFTER

1.00

-0.10

0.58

-0.02

-0.52

0.30

-0.39

0.48

-0.32

MERGED

-0.10

1.00

0.53

0.18

-0.23

0.20

-0.26

0.15

-0.21

AFTER*MERGED

0.58

0.53

1.00

0.20

-0.59

0.42

-0.57

0.49

-0.41

MORT_AMI

-0.02

0.18

0.20

1.00

-0.38

0.30

-0.26

0.16

-0.39

READM_AMI

-0.52

-0.23

-0.59

-0.38

1.00

-0.58

0.71

-0.59

0.57

MORT_HF

0.30

0.20

0.42

0.30

-0.58

1.00

-0.77

0.68

-0.42

READM_HF

-0.39

-0.26

-0.57

-0.26

0.71

-0.77

1.00

-0.68

0.61

MORT_PN

0.48

0.15

0.49

0.16

-0.59

0.68

-0.68

1.00

-0.39

READM_PN

-0.32

-0.21

-0.41

-0.39

0.57

-0.42

0.61

-0.39

1.00

HSP_9_10

0.17

-0.06

0.08

-0.14

-0.21

0.07

-0.23

0.02

-0.22

REC_Y

0.03

-0.10

-0.04

-0.13

-0.11

0.01

-0.15

-0.09

-0.15

GOVT

0.00

0.04

0.04

0.27

-0.07

0.08

-0.09

0.08

-0.13

NONPROFIT

-0.04

-0.02

-0.03

-0.17

0.10

-0.09

0.09

-0.12

0.05

FORPROFIT

0.05

-0.02

0.00

-0.08

-0.06

0.04

-0.03

0.09

0.08

PAYM_AMI

-0.21

0.07

-0.09

0.05

0.22

0.01

0.13

-0.13

0.27

PAYM_HF

-0.02

0.05

0.02

-0.03

0.11

0.07

0.06

0.03

0.24

PAYM_PN

-0.07

0.06

0.00

0.01

0.15

0.05

0.08

-0.04

0.25

UNITS

0.04

-0.05

-0.01

0.03

-0.02

0.08

-0.16

0.04

-0.08

0.11

0.15

0.06

-0.36

-0.10

-0.10

0.01

0.18

-0.05

HSP_9_10

REC_Y

GOVT

NONPROFIT

FORPROFIT

PAYM_AMI

PAYM_HF

PAYM_PN

UNITS

YEAR

AFTER

0.17

0.03

0.00

-0.04

0.05

-0.21

-0.02

-0.07

0.04

0.11

MERGED

-0.06

-0.10

0.04

-0.02

-0.02

0.07

0.05

0.06

-0.05

0.15

AFTER*MERGED

0.08

-0.04

0.04

-0.03

0.00

-0.09

0.02

0.00

-0.01

0.06

MORT_AMI

-0.14

-0.13

0.27

-0.17

-0.08

0.05

-0.03

0.01

0.03

-0.36

READM_AMI

-0.21

-0.11

-0.07

0.10

-0.06

0.22

0.11

0.15

-0.02

-0.10

MORT_HF

0.07

0.01

0.08

-0.09

0.04

0.01

0.07

0.05

0.08

-0.10

READM_HF

-0.23

-0.15

-0.09

0.09

-0.03

0.13

0.06

0.08

-0.16

0.01

MORT_PN

0.02

-0.09

0.08

-0.12

0.09

-0.13

0.03

-0.04

0.04

0.18

READM_PN

-0.22

-0.15

-0.13

0.05

0.08

0.27

0.24

0.25

-0.08

-0.05

HSP_9_10

1.00

0.92

-0.17

-0.07

0.30

-0.39

-0.39

-0.41

-0.13

0.03

REC_Y

0.92

1.00

-0.10

-0.07

0.22

-0.25

-0.28

-0.29

-0.03

-0.07

GOVT

-0.17

-0.10

1.00

-0.73

-0.14

0.08

0.04

0.06

0.17

-0.29

NONPROFIT

-0.07

-0.07

-0.73

1.00

-0.57

0.03

0.03

0.03

-0.06

0.20

FORPROFIT

0.30

0.22

-0.14

-0.57

1.00

-0.14

-0.10

-0.12

-0.12

0.06

PAYM_AMI

-0.39

-0.25

0.08

0.03

-0.14

1.00

0.88

0.90

0.32

-0.23

PAYM_HF

-0.39

-0.28

0.04

0.03

-0.10

0.88

1.00

0.98

0.29

-0.08

PAYM_PN

-0.41

-0.29

0.06

0.03

-0.12

0.90

0.98

1.00

0.29

-0.12

UNITS

-0.13

-0.03

0.17

-0.06

-0.12

0.32

0.29

0.29

1.00

-0.12

YEAR

0.03

-0.07

-0.29

0.20

0.06

-0.23

-0.08

-0.12

-0.12

1.00

YEAR
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All OLS regressions were run using EViews. Table 5 presents the estimates of the
effects of the DID variables on patient quality outcomes as outlined in Equation 1. Only
AMI mortality rate, AMI readmission rate, and PN readmission rate significantly
decreased from the year before the merge to the year after the merge. All three
conditions, however, had mortality and readmission rates that were significantly impacted
by the combined effect of the presence of a merger on an acquired hospital over the threeyear period centered on the year of the merge. All mortality rates increased while all
readmission rates decreased as a result of a hospital merger over time, on average, ceteris
paribus. The coefficient of 2.67 on the interaction term in regression (5), for example,
indicates that the increase in PN mortality rate over the three-year time period centered
on the year of a hospital merger was 1.96 percentage points greater, on average, than the
increase in PN mortality rate over three years for hospitals that did not merge. A
graphical representation of this significant difference is illustrated in Figure 1. HF
readmission rates experienced the largest absolute change of all six measures, with
merged hospitals possessing an average 4.20 percent lower HF readmission rate the year
after the merge compared to the matched unmerged hospitals, ceteris paribus. HF also
had the greatest magnitude change in mortality rate of the three conditions, with merged
hospitals possessing an average 2.97 percent higher HF mortality rate the year after the
merge compared to the matched unmerged hospitals, ceteris paribus.
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Table 5. Mortality and readmission rates as a function of DID variables.
Dependent Variables
(3)
(4)

(1)

(2)

MORT_AMI

READM_AMI

MORT_HF

-1.13*
(0.59)

-1.63***
(0.47)

MERGED

0.01
(0.59)

AFTER*MERGED

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of
observations

Independent
Variables
AFTER

(5)

(6)

READM_HF

MORT_PN

READM_PN

0.51
(0.69)

-0.84
(0.66)

1.77***
(0.63)

-0.76*
(0.44)

-0.22
(0.45)

-0.06
(0.69)

0.04
(0.66)

-0.35
(0.63)

-0.28
(0.44)

1.96**
(0.84)

-2.36***
(0.65)

2.97***
(0.98)

-4.20***
(0.93)

2.67***
(0.89)

-1.33**
(0.63)

0.06
0.04

0.40
0.39

0.17
0.15

0.32
0.30

0.27
0.25

0.17
0.15

175

171

176

176

176

176

Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients
for each independent variable.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Figure 1. Graphical representation of difference-in-differences due to the effect of a
hospital M&A on various quality and cost metrics.

Table 6 shows the inclusion of the two hospital ownership dummy variables, the
constant term that represents the nonprofit hospital category, and the three conditionspecific mortality rates as independent variables. Regression specifications (1), (2), (3),
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(4), (5), and (6) followed Equation 2; and specifications (2a), (4a), and (6a) followed
Equation 3. Even with the addition of these variables, all regressions except specification
(6a) yielded statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term, a result
indicating that a merge did have a notable effect on 30-day patient outcome rates for
AMI, HF, and PN. Again, all mortality rates have a positive coefficient on the interaction
term, with HF mortality having the largest value, and all readmission rates have a
negative coefficient on the interaction term, with the greatest negative value for HF
readmission when controlling only for the DID variables and ownership in column (4).
Even though the magnitudes of the coefficients on each condition-specific readmission
rate decrease when controlling for more factors, the fact that they still retain a negative
sign and the same level of significance, except for column (6a), suggests a prominent
effect of hospital mergers on hospital quality of care.
Hospital ownership largely did not seem to have a significant effect on
performance on the selected mortality and readmission quality measures except for AMI
and PN mortality. Government-owned hospitals had a 1.90 percent and 1.39 percent
higher AMI mortality rate and PN mortality rate, respectively, than nonprofit hospitals.
For-profit hospitals, on the other hand, revealed no significant differences in quality
outcomes from nonprofit hospitals. Furthermore, increases in each mortality rate are
shown to result in decreases in the corresponding readmission rates for AMI, HF, and
PN, holding other variables constant. The decrease in HF readmission rate consequent a 1
percentage point increase in the condition-specific mortality rate is more than twice the
decrease for AMI readmission rate and more than five times that for PN.
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Table 6. Mortality and readmission rates as a function of all independent variables.
Dependent Variables
(3)
(4)
(4a)
MORT_HF READM_HF READM_HF
0.52
-0.85
-0.51
(0.70)
(0.66)
(0.48)

(1)
MORT_AMI
-1.09*
(0.58)

(2)
READM_AMI
-1.62***
(0.47)

(2a)
READM_AMI
-1.98***
(0.44)

(5)
MORT_PN
1.78***
(0.62)

(6)
READM_PN
-0.77*
(0.44)

(6a)
READM_PN
-0.56
(0.45)

MERGED

0.01
(0.57)

-0.23
(0.45)

-0.22
(0.42)

-0.05
(0.70)

0.03
(0.66)

-0.01
(0.48)

-0.32
(0.62)

-0.28
(0.44)

-0.32
(0.44)

AFTER*MERGED

1.92**
(0.81)

-2.35***
(0.65)

-1.75***
(0.61)

2.95***
(0.98)

-4.18***
(0.93)

-2.25***
(0.69)

2.67***
(0.88)

-1.32**
(0.63)

-1.01
(0.64)

C

15.42***
(0.42)

20.21***
(0.33)

24.88***
(0.92)

10.89***
(0.52)

24.79***
(0.49)

31.92***
(0.67)

11.29***
(0.46)

18.70***
(0.33)

20.02***
(0.69)

GOVT

1.90***
(0.57)

-0.57
(0.45)

0.01
(0.43)

0.69
(0.69)

-0.89
(0.65)

-0.43
(0.48)

1.39**
(0.62)

-0.47
(0.44)

-0.31
(0.44)

FORPROFIT

-0.33
(0.65)

-0.47
(0.52)

-0.57
(0.48)

0.32
(0.79)

-0.55
(0.74)

-0.34
(0.54)

1.05
(0.70)

0.13
(0.50)

0.26
(0.50)

MORT_AMI

-

-

-0.30***
(0.06)

-

-

-

-

-

-

MORT_HF

-

-

-

-

-

-0.65***
(0.05)

-

-

-

MORT_PN

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.12**
(0.05)

0.12
0.10

0.40
0.39

0.49
0.48

0.17
0.15

0.33
0.31

0.65
0.63

0.29
0.27

0.17
0.15

0.20
0.17

175

171

171

176

176

176

176

176

176

Independent Variables
AFTER

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of
observations

Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients for each independent variable.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Following analysis of mergers on AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates, the
specifications in Table 7 did not yield significant effects of hospital mergers on the two global
HCAHPS scores. Regressions (1) and (2) followed Equation 1, and regressions (1a) and (2a)
followed Equation 2. Contrary to the results in Table 6 comparing the quality outcomes for the
different hospital ownership types, significant differences in patient satisfaction scores are seen
between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals but not between government-owned and nonprofit
hospitals. For-profit hospitals showed a greater patient likelihood to rate the hospital a 9 or a 10
and to definitely recommend the hospital than did nonprofit hospitals.

Table 7. Global patient satisfaction measures as a function of DID and hospital
ownership variables.
Dependent Variables
(1)
(1a)
(2)
(2a)
HSP_9_10
HSP_9_10
REC_Y
REC_Y
Independent Variables
1.02
0.89
-0.73
-0.82
AFTER
(1.72)
(1.69)
(1.99)
(1.98)
MERGED

-1.66
(1.72)

-1.54
(1.69)

-2.14
(1.99)

-2.04
(1.98)

AFTER*MERGED

1.36
(2.43)

1.38
(2.39)

0.80
(2.81)

0.80
(2.80)

C

-

67.68***
(1.25)

-

71.48***
(1.47)

GOVT

-

-0.78
(1.67)

-

-0.01
(1.97)

FORPROFIT

-

5.08***
(1.90)

-

4.19*
(2.24)

0.02
-0.0003
176

0.06
0.03
176

0.01
-0.01
176

0.03
0.002
176

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations

Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the
coefficients for each independent variable.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 8 presents the regression coefficients on the three DID variables, the three
hospital ownership types modeled by two dummy variables and the constant term, and
the six mortality and readmission rates and hospital overall rating quality measures when
analyzing their effects on median Medicare payments for AMI, HF, and PN patients
discharged alive with MCC. Regression specifications (1), (2), and (3) were modelled by
Equation 4; (1a), (2a), and (3a) were modelled by Equation 5; and (1b), (2b), and (3b)
followed Equation 6. AMI was the only condition that showed significant decreases in
Medicare payment over time in columns (1) and (1a). None of the Medicare
reimbursement rates were significantly different over time consequent a hospital merger
and also saw largely insignificant effects from the corresponding condition mortality and
readmission rates; PN readmission rate was the only patient outcome measure that
possessed a significant coefficient. Government-owned and for-profit hospitals did not
show significant differences from nonprofit hospitals for all three MS-DRG payments.
Interestingly, the hospital rating coefficient for each condition’s MS-DRG reimbursement
amount was significantly negative.
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Table 8. Median Medicare payments as a function of all variables.
Dependent Variables
(2)
(2a)
(2b)
PAYM_HF PAYM_HF
PAYM_HF
-90.43
-87.77
-24.32
(316.88)
(318.68)
(293.75)
53.23
49.46
-65.03
(315.06)
(316.78)
(291.25)

(1)
PAYM_AMI
-1,028.42**
(451.49)
222.00
(440.60)

(1a)
PAYM_AMI
-1,015.10**
(452.41)
209.36
(441.41)

(1b)
PAYM_AMI
-546.06
(455.59)
92.99
(411.63)

(3)
PAYM_PN
-202.66
(320.71)
99.84
(318.86)

(3a)
PAYM_PN
-194.80
(321.99)
92.40
(320.07)

(3b)
PAYM_PN
-25.00
(300.14)
12.88
(292.13)

178.84
(638.50)

167.30
(639.81)

354.84
(627.86)

26.92
(446.85)

28.03
(449.19)

39.83
(435.84)

16.59
(452.25)

16.18
(453.86)

282.24
(426.07)

C

-

15,763.51***
(2,875.71)
51.09
(430.27)

-

GOVT

11,896.22***
(327.37)
205.47
(446.88)

9,442.96***
(234.35)
-83.91
(314.61)

13,505.46***
(1,982.06)
-167.34
(290.57)

-

9,243.12***
(236.78)
-31.89
(317.88)

11,974.75***
(1,623.56)
-23.20
(293.44)

FORPROFIT

-

20.86
(502.31)
17.47
(61.57)

-

MORT_AMI

-556.36
(522.39)
-

208.04
(334.75)
-

-

-

-165.75
(357.61)
-

-

-327.37
(361.33)
-

22.63
(338.36)
-

READM_AMI

-

-

100.56
(79.90)

-

-

-

-

-

-

MORT_HF

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

55.06
(44.75)
18.71
(47.98)

READM_HF

-

-

-

MORT_PN

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

READM_PN

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-8.10
(36.56)
114.55**
(52.28)

HSP_9_10

-

-

-

-

-

0.06
0.04
168

0.001
-0.02
175

0.003
-0.03
175

-75.73***
(13.56)
0.18
0.14
175

-

0.06
0.04
168

-90.99***
(20.51)
0.18
0.14
166

0.01
-0.01
175

0.01
-0.02
175

Independent Variables
AFTER
MERGED
AFTER*MERGED

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations

-

-

Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients for each independent variable.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

-70.65***
(13.58)
0.20
0.16
175
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Hospital M&As generate large-scale, institutional changes that have not been found
to be uniform across all target hospitals. This chapter will analyze the results presented
previously and discuss how this study either adds to existing literature or sheds new light
on the effects of hospital M&As on healthcare quality and cost.
When analyzing AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates as a function
of the three DID variables in Table 5, both measures for each condition showed
significant changes as a result of a merger or acquisition beyond what would have
occurred simply over time, without the presence of a merger. All mortality rates
increased while all readmission rates decreased, and these results align with Hayford et
al.’s (2012) findings of increased mortality rates and Suter et al.’s (2014) findings of
decreased readmission rates after a merger. Congruent with all mortality rates changing
in one direction and all readmission rates changing in the other, Table 4 reveals a positive
relationship among all three mortality rates as well as among all readmission rates for
AMI, HF, and PN. This observation may be due to hospitals with poor performance on
one quality metric exhibiting suboptimal performance on other similar quality metrics as
well, and the same concept can be applied for high-performing hospitals.
There was some variation in the magnitude of the effects of hospital mergers on
mortality and readmission rates. HF possessed the greatest positive coefficients on the
interaction term with mortality as the dependent variable in column (3) of both Tables 5
and 6; HF also possessed the largest negative coefficients on the interaction term with
readmission as the dependent variable in column (4) of Table 5 and in columns (4) and
(4a) of Table 6. The fact that HF mortality and readmission rates were affected most
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prominently may support why previous studies have found only this condition, not AMI
nor PN, to show an overall increase in mortality and an association between mortality and
readmission, and why McIlvennan et al. (2015) analyzed the inverse relationship between
mortality and readmission rate only for HF (Krumholtz et al., 2013; Suter et al., 2014). It
is unclear why much of the compelling evidence concerning these two quality outcomes
pertains to HF. There may be elements to the disease and specific courses of treatment
themselves that cause HF to show different patterns and relationships between mortality
and readmission rates than AMI and PN. These previous studies all questioned the
strength of the correlation between mortality and readmission rates due to their finding of
HF to be the only condition yielding moderate results at best. If higher mortality rates did
lead to healthier patients being discharged with a lower risk of readmission, this inverse
relationship should have been observed across AMI, HF, and PN.
Despite these findings, the results of this study illustrate statistically significant,
negative associations between all three condition-specific mortality and readmission
rates, regardless of the fact that AMI’s and PN’s quality outcomes did not show changes
as large as those for HF. Table 4 shows this negative relationship as do the regression
results in specifications (2a), (4a), and (6a) of Table 6, holding other variables constant.
There are some potential reasons for observing this correlation between mortality and
readmission. First, readmissions could be inversely affected by the competing risk of
death, such that a patient who dies during an index episode of care can never be
readmitted. Therefore, if a hospital has a higher mortality rate, then a smaller proportion
of its discharged patients are eligible for readmission. On the other hand, if a hospital has
a lower mortality rate due to improved quality of care, the greater possible readmission
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rate may be a consequence of this successful care (Gorodeski et al., 2010). Furthermore,
some hospitals may have a lower threshold for admission and readmission that would
cause them to hospitalize lower-acuity patients. As a result, readmission rates would be
inflated and mortality rates reduced (McIlvennan et al., 2015).
The opposite signs of the significant coefficients on the interaction term, positive
for mortality and negative for readmission, in Table 6 corroborate the inverse relationship
between condition-specific mortality and readmission rates found in columns (2a), (4a),
and (6a) because following a hospital merger, mortality and readmission are seen to be
affected in opposing directions. Table 6 controls for additional variables than those
presented in Table 5, and the fact that the coefficients on the interaction terms are still
significant supports the robustness of the effect of hospital mergers on healthcare quality
outcomes. Hospital merger events often occur to relieve a hospital from bankruptcy or
another reason for unsustainability, and the acquiring entity usually reallocates resources
to the target hospital to keep it operational. This increase in available resources in turn
may lead to infrastructure expansion and, consequently, increased treatment intensity. An
increased provision of surgeries for AMI, HF, and PN may improve the length or quality
of life for some patients, and hospitals that perform higher volumes of procedures tend to
have better outcomes (Hayford, 2012). Therefore, a smaller group of discharged patients
eligible for readmission due to higher mortality rates coupled with the increase in patient
outcomes from merger-induced procedural volume increases could very well lead to
lower readmission rates across the board (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Hayford, 2012; Kizer,
2003).
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The significant decreases in AMI, HF, and PN readmission rates found in this
study may also be explained by policymakers’ emphasis on reducing 30-day readmission
rates. The widening adoption of the HCAHPS Survey and public reporting of hospital
scores on Hospital Compare has incentivized hospitals to dedicate more attention and
resources to improving patient experiences and outcomes. Especially with the growth of
publicly accessible healthcare information and the consumer tendency to research this
information to guide their health-related decision-making, a respectable public image is
essential if a hospital wants to remain competitive in the market for prospective patients.
The major driver behind this increased pressure to perform well on publicly accountable
measures is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, which
established the Hospital VBP Program in 2011 and the Hospital Readmission Reduction
Program (HRRP) in 2012. The VBP program marked the first time hospitals began being
paid based on their care quality, not quantity, and applies to payments beginning in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2013 for hospitals under the IPPS. Under VBP, CMS withholds a small
percentage – approximately 1 to 2 percentage points – of the base DRG reimbursement
paid to hospitals that can be earned back based on either how well they perform on each
measure or how much they improve their performance on each measure compared to
their performance during a baseline period. If hospitals perform well enough to be
reimbursed beyond the initial withhold, they effectively earn a net bonus. HCAHPS
scores have comprised a consistent domain in every year’s VBP program, along with
clinical process of care measures, and outcome measures including mortality and
readmission rates were added to the program starting FY 2014 (OPPS VBP Final Rule
11.1.11). While VBP allows hospitals to receive a payment bonus, the HRRP is strictly a
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penalty program that reduces payments to hospitals with excess all-cause readmissions
within 30 days of discharge. Since its implementation, the HRRP included only AMI,
HF, and PN as applicable conditions during the five years relevant to this study until
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective total hip or total knee
replacement were added in 2015 and coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG) in 2017
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services). In response to these federal regulations and
pay-for-performance programs that financially incentivize hospitals to enhance their
quality of care, it is not surprising that readmission rates have improved as a result (Suter
et al., 2014).
Considering that one of the main reasons hospitals merge is to avoid financial
insolvency and to recover the capacity to operate effectively, engaging in a merger would
allow underperforming hospitals or those at risk of closure to regain footing in being able
to adhere to the policies mandated in the ACA. Mergers may place a target hospital under
a large healthcare system that can provide necessary infrastructure and staffing or even
introduce new operations and informatics that will help streamline healthcare delivery.
Therefore, the ACA and associated pressures from federal performance-based programs
like the VBP and HRRP strongly encourage M&As as a means to consolidate healthcare
goods and services for quality improvement on outcomes measures crucial for CMS
reimbursement.
This heavy focus on readmissions for AMI, HF, and PN, however, may be
misguided because only a small proportion of 30-day readmissions are preventable; only
12 percent were found preventable in studies that used clinical data. Hospital readmission
rates are affected predominantly by the composition of a hospital’s patient population and

Su 51
community resources, and hospitals have little control over factors such as the incidence
of mental illness and poverty as well as potentially poor social support for patients. As a
result, the immense efforts hospitals are dedicating towards reducing readmissions may
be detracting from the attention and resources that could be spent improving inpatient
safety and mortality rates (Joynt and Jha, 2012). Thus, the decreased readmission rates
over time as a consequence of a hospital merger, shown in Tables 5 and 6, can be
explained in part by intense pressures from federal healthcare reform programs to earn
reimbursements through fewer 30-day unplanned readmissions. The increased mortality
rates, subsequently, may be a byproduct of potentially misappropriated resource and time
allocation that strives to reduce readmissions that are largely unavoidable rather than to
emphasize inpatient safety and death prevention.
Although the data in Table 4 show that the two global HCAHPS measures are
positively associated with time, the regression results in Table 7 do not support the same
conclusion. The lack of significant evidence of improved patient satisfaction scores over
time is surprising because of the revolutionary federal policies and programs of
healthcare reform that have placed considerable focus on increasing access to and quality
of care while reducing medical expenditures. Since hospitals are increasingly held
accountable for their performance on patient outcomes and satisfaction scores through
public reporting and value-based reimbursement, it would have been expected for
hospitals to prioritize improving patient experience. Moreover, a merged hospital can
receive additional resources and staff from its acquirer to facilitate increased and more
efficient operations. However, Table 7 shows no significant changes in hospital overall
rating or patient likelihood to definitely recommend a hospital as a function of time or a
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merger. It could be that one year post-merger is not an adequate amount of time for all
operational adjustments to a target hospital to be fully implemented and integrated. Since
traditional methods of care delivery and operation may undergo considerable changes
during this transition period, existing and potentially new staff alike may be spending
their time and effort trying to accustom themselves to a shifting environment rather than
focusing on performing at their highest capacity for direct patient care. Delays due to
tedious administrative protocols and staff confusion regarding new procedures or medical
technology would adversely affect patient care and as a result, patient satisfaction.
The significant increases in mortality rate and decreases in readmission rates, as
shown in Tables 5 and 6, may also contribute to negligible changes in global HCAHPS
scores. Since readmissions do not necessarily entail death, patients may derive greater
satisfaction from a higher chance of surviving their hospitalization without being injured
than from a lower probability of being readmitted to the hospital (Joynt and Jha, 2012).
The quality of care and interaction with the staff a patient experiences while in the
hospital play extremely important roles in shaping the patient’s perception of care, and an
injury-free inpatient stay is much preferred to one in which patient safety is
compromised. Therefore, the fact that mortality rates were found to increase for AMI,
HF, and PN after a merger could be an explanatory factor for the lack of significant
increases in patient satisfaction scores over time consequent a hospital merger deal.
Similar to previous studies that found no marked differences in quality outcomes
based on hospital ownership type, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals did not show any
significant differences in mortality or readmission rates for any of the three conditions
(McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001). Table 6 does
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reveal, however, that nonprofit hospitals perform significantly better than governmentowned hospitals, though only on AMI and PN mortality rates. Table 4 also shows that
these two outcome measures have a positive correlation with public, government
hospitals and a negative correlation with private, nonprofit hospitals. This result provides
additional insight into how public and private hospitals compare and supports existing
literature that concluded that private hospitals deliver greater quality of care. Many
causes may factor into why this maybe so. Private institutions usually have a greater
proportion of their patient population possessing medical insurance, whether it be private
or through their employers. Therefore, these patients are better able to pay for the cost of
their healthcare goods and services, and their hospitals in turn have a greater capacity to
invest in adequate infrastructure and staff needed to improve care and patient outcomes
(Basu et al., 2012).
Public hospitals are also commonly referred to as safety net hospitals because
they accept patients regardless of insurance status (Werner et al., 2008). Thus, public
hospitals are usually very impacted with patients who cannot pay for emergency and
acute care and, as a result, often have long queues and patient wait times. This suboptimal
access to care can cause a substantial amount of stress for both patients and healthcare
staff, especially when hospital personnel are overworked due to a seemingly unending
patient flow. As a consequence, overwhelmed and overextended staff are more prone to
medical errors, and patients under a higher level of stress are more likely to experience
adverse health effects. These characteristic burdens of public, government-owned
hospitals, in turn, may result in higher 30-day mortality rates.
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Despite the findings of government hospitals performing more poorly than
nonprofit hospitals on two of the three condition-specific mortality measures, this
relationship does not translate for patient perception and satisfaction scores. Table 7
illustrates significant differences in global HCAHPS scores between nonprofit hospitals
and for-profit hospitals, but not between nonprofit and government hospitals. Columns
(1a) and (2a) show that for-profit hospitals score higher than nonprofit hospitals for
overall rating and for likelihood of definitely recommending the hospital. Even though
this result does not reflect previous findings that on average, for-profit hospitals tend to
have higher mortality or other adverse event rates than nonprofit hospitals (McClellan
and Staiger, 2000), it does align with existing literature on consumer perceptions of
hospitals based on ownership-related dimensions. Since nonprofit hospitals are
sometimes portrayed in the media as desperately needing capital due to high debt-to-asset
ratios, consumers are likely to view for-profit hospitals as more capable, coordinated, and
efficient in their care delivery due to adequate resources and infrastructure (Drevs et al.,
2014; Sloan et al., 2003). Furthermore, for-profit hospitals are more likely to offer
profitable services that are often complex and not available everywhere, such as openheart surgeries (Horwitz, 2005). Access to tertiary care such as complicated but lifesaving surgeries may contribute to higher global ratings because these proprietary
hospitals offer necessary services that patients cannot find in other medical facilities.
Additionally, some for-profit hospitals employ customer relationship management
programs and affiliation with social causes or welfare initiatives to improve patient
satisfaction, especially to address potential public perception of the hospital’s conflict of
interest between making a profit and providing philanthropic healthcare to patients
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(Akinci et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2004). Thus, hospital ownership
status has differing effects depending on the quality measure under consideration.
Nonprofit hospitals seem to have significantly lower AMI and PN mortality rates than
government hospitals, but they also appear to possess lower global HCAHPS scores than
for-profit hospitals.
Analysis of the effect of the DID variables, hospital ownership, and quality
outcomes on Medicare payments showed the least amount of significant evidence. All
three Medicare reimbursement amounts were not significantly affected by a hospital
merger over time or by hospital ownership status, as reported in Table 8. It may be that
one year post-consolidation is not sufficient in markedly changing the surrounding
market and thus the wage index that contributes to each FY’s base payment rate
calculation.
It is worth noting the fact that the hospital overall rating coefficients in columns
(1b), (2b), and (3b) of Table 8 for each condition’s MS-DRG reimbursement amount is
significantly negative. This result conflicts with intuitive reasoning because it would be
expected that hospitals with higher overall ratings would have higher reimbursements.
However, since the payment variables in this study concern predetermined MS-DRG
reimbursements, payment amounts comprise all services associated with an inpatient stay
for a particular condition. Though each DRG is given a weight reflecting the average
relative costliness of cases in that group compared with the average Medicare case, high
cost outliers would increase the reimbursement amount for patients who are sicker and
require more complex care. On the other hand, these outlier cases could also entail
patients who potentially acquire iatrogenic illnesses or are subject to extraordinarily
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severe overdiagnosis and overtreatment. These latter two instances would place the
patient at risk, unnecessarily elevate healthcare costs, and be cause for lower patient
satisfaction and overall hospital ratings. Physicians are pressured from financial, legal,
and professional standpoints to overutilize medical services and technology; their
reimbursements rely on all the tests and procedures they order, and the constant threat of
malpractice lawsuits and patients’ desires for what they deem to be thorough care drive
physicians to overtreat and cover all bases. Much of the care that is provided is
unnecessary and wasteful, and may even pose harm to patients. Overutilization of
services is only growing consequent the continual advancement of medical technology,
and the increases in MS-DRG base payments every year may reflect this trend in
increasing cost of care at little to no benefit to patients. Therefore, it is the reverse
causality of higher median Medicare payments for the three MS-DRGs on lower patient
satisfaction scores that may be significant and worthy of further investigation.
A behavioral economics approach may also shed light on this phenomenon of
higher payments being associated with lower overall hospital ratings. A growing body of
evidence indicates that tangible rewards, especially monetary ones, undermine motivation
and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks, especially when intrinsic
motivation is high (Himmelstein et al., 2014). For example, Medicare payments could
cause physicians to focus more on how they will be reimbursed for their services rather
than on how they can optimize these services to best care for their patients. This
reasoning is supported by the lack of robust associations between the mortality and
readmission rates and Medicare reimbursement amounts shown in Table 8; other studies
have similarly found no evidence that financial incentives improve patient outcomes
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(Flodgren et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2011). These findings may suggest necessary reform
in the way physicians are compensated for their services so that the inherent desire to
care for the ill and to enhance the patient experience is not overtaken by the
preoccupation with maximizing reimbursements.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper examines the effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions on healthcare
quality and cost. Analyses utilized data on inpatient mortality and readmission rates for
AMI, HF, and PN, two global HCAHPS measures of overall hospital rating and
likelihood to recommend the hospital, hospital ownership status, and median Medicare
reimbursements for MS-DRGs 193, 280, and 291 from hospitals that merged in 2011,
2012, or 2013 and their matched, unmerged hospitals.
AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates show significant changes as a
result of a merger or acquisition beyond what would have occurred simply over time,
without the presence of a merger. All mortality rates increased while all readmission rates
decreased, and a positive relationship was found among all three mortality rates as well
as among all readmission rates for the three conditions. HF mortality and readmission
rates were affected most prominently, and it may be due to particularities with the disease
and associated treatment that cause HF to show different patterns and relationships
between mortality and readmission rates than AMI and PN.
This study’s findings of statistically significant, negative associations between all
three condition-specific mortality and readmission rates further support the inverse
relationship between the two outcomes rates following a hospital merger. The significant
decreases in AMI, HF, and PN readmission rates found in this study may be explained in
part by policymakers’ emphasis on reducing 30-day readmission rates. Federal policies
like the ACA and associated programs such as Hospital VBP and HRRP incentivize
hospitals to dedicate more attention and resources to improving patient experiences and
outcomes. Mergers may facilitate increased performance according to these federal
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measures because underperforming hospitals or those at severe financial risk would be
able to obtain necessary infrastructure and staffing from their acquiring entities to
reinvigorate operations. Therefore, reduced readmission rates consequent a merger is not
surprising considering the immense federal pressure and emphasis on quality
improvement. This heavy focus on decreasing readmission rates, however, may cause
hospitals to forego equally robust efforts in enhancing other important measures like
mortality rate. As a result, the increased mortality rates found in this study may be a
byproduct of potentially misappropriated resource and time allocation that strives to
reduce readmissions that are largely unavoidable rather than to emphasize inpatient safety
and death prevention.
The lack of significant evidence of improved patient satisfaction scores over time
due to a merger is surprising because hospitals are increasingly held accountable for their
performance on patient outcomes and satisfaction scores through public reporting and
value-based reimbursement. It could be that one year post-merger is not an adequate
amount of time for the newly acquired hospitals to smooth out all the operational
adjustments or to fully utilize new capital gained through the merger. Delays due to
tedious administrative protocols and staff confusion regarding new procedures or medical
technology would adversely affect patient care and as a result, patient satisfaction.
Additionally, the fact that mortality rates were found to increase for AMI, HF, and PN
after a merger could be an explanatory factor for the lack of significant increases in
patient satisfaction scores over time consequent a hospital merger deal because patients
may prefer an injury-free inpatient stay to one in which their safety is compromised.
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Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals did not show any significant differences in
mortality or readmission rates for any of the three conditions, but nonprofit hospitals
were found to perform significantly better than government-owned hospitals on AMI and
PN mortality rates. Private institutions usually have a greater proportion of their patient
population who are able to pay for their care through private insurance. As a result,
hospitals would have a greater capacity to invest in adequate infrastructure and staff
needed to improve care and patient outcomes. Another reason that government hospitals
may have poorer performance than nonprofit hospitals is that public hospitals must care
for all patients who present there, regardless of their ability to pay. This high volume of
uninsured patients would stress and overwork staff who are then more prone to making
potentially harmful mistakes that could contribute to higher 30-day mortality rates.
When analyzing the two global HCAHPS scores of overall hospital rating of a 9
or 10 and the likelihood of definitely recommending the hospital, significant differences
were found between nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals; for-profit hospitals
scored higher than nonprofit hospitals on both measures. Proprietary hospitals are more
likely to offer complex services that patients may not be able to feasibly find elsewhere,
and these hospitals also probably have the necessary funds and resources to implement
customer relations programs and patient satisfaction-oriented institutional initiatives.
Finally, Medicare payments were not significantly affected by hospital M&As
over time. This result may reflect the need for a longer time period of analysis such that
the indices involved in the base payment rate calculation are sufficiently different from
past years. One result of importance, however, is the fact that hospital overall rating was
negatively associated with mean Medicare reimbursement for all three MS-DRGs. This
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relationship could be explained by an above normal prevalence of high cost outliers that
would increase the reimbursement amount for patients who are sicker and require more
complex care. Unusually high costs may also be a factor of overdiagnosis and
overtreatment due to financial, legal, and professional pressures on physicians to
overutilize medical services and technology. A major unintended shortcoming of
monetary rewards for the quantity and quality of care physicians provide is the possibility
that doctors begin to focus more on how they will be paid rather than how they can better
and more altruistically serve their patients. Additionally, unnecessary care could
adversely affect patient health, and higher MS-DRG payments from a greater number of
medical services done could lead to poorer patient outcomes and satisfaction of care.
Greater efforts should be directed toward improving mortality rates in addition to
readmission rates. The federal programs currently in place consequent the passage of the
ACA put a tremendous focus on preventing patient readmissions, but improving inpatient
safety and mortality metrics should not be any less stressed. Furthermore, all hospitals,
regardless of ownership status, should constantly strive to provide patient-centered,
integrated, and coordinated care so patient experiences continue to improve. To address
the potentially misguided physician reimbursement schedules currently in place, it may
be valuable to consider other, non-financial incentives to enhance quality of care so that
physicians maintain their altruistic motivations for providing healthcare.
This study has some limitations that should be addressed. First, all systematic
differences between hospitals that merge and those that do not merge, such as
competition, patient case mix, market shares, and hospital location, were not controlled
for. Second, the research may not have captured all the hospital mergers that occurred in

Su 62
the U.S. Only publicly announced transactions are included in Irving Levin Associates’s
annual reports. Third, three years may not have been a sufficient time period for hospital
performance to change significantly; it probably takes longer than one year for the
merger to have any notable effects. Fourth, health industry changes consequent federal
healthcare reform policies were not comprehensively incorporated. Beyond what was
discussed in this paper regarding the ACA, VBP, and HRRP, many other healthcare
legislations were passed that could possibly have had an effect on the variables in this
study. Fifth, though there were only a few cases at most with which this is pertinent, the
analyses did not take into account the new sizes of target hospitals after they were
acquired. Finally, regressions were not conducted that analyzed the differences between
government and for-profit hospitals in quality and cost measures; both ownership types
were only assessed for significant difference in reference to the nonprofit group.
There are many avenues this study provides whereby to conduct more thorough
research to better understand the longer-term implications of hospital mergers. It would
be interesting to study the impacts of a hospital’s state, status as rural or urban, and
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which measures market concentration, on propensity
to merge and how a merger would affect efficiency metrics and staffing composition.
Additionally, using Medicare spending per beneficiary would allow for broader analysis
of healthcare costs, and future studies could also look into how M&As affect hospital
profitability. Since this study used only outcomes measures, the mortality and
readmissions rates, future studies could investigate how process of care measures are
impacted by a merger. Lastly, it would be valuable to analyze potential organizational
culture components associated with successful quality improvements and cost reductions
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post-merger and whether cultural resistance in any way hinders these goals after hospital
M&As.

Su 64
REFERENCES
"30-day unplanned readmission and death measures." Medicare.gov - the Official U.S.
Government Site for Medicare. Accessed March 10, 2017.
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/30-day-measures.html.
"About Irving Levin Associates." Levin Associates Products. Accessed March 10, 2017.
https://products.levinassociates.com/aboutus/.
"Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System." Health Care Policy and
Politics A to Z (n.d.): n. pag. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Dec. 2016
Accessed Feb 8, 2017. https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.
Akinci, Fevzi, A. Ezel Esatoglu, Dilaver Tengilimoglu, and Amy Parsons. 2005. Hospital
choice factors: A case study in turkey. Health Marketing Quarterly 22 (1): 3-19.
Alexander, J. A., M. T. Halpern, and S. Y. Lee. 1996. The short-term effects of merger
on hospital operations. Health Services Research 30 (6) (Feb): 827-47.
"American Hospital Directory - Hospital Statistics by State." American Hospital
Directory - Hospital Statistics by State. Accessed March 10, 2017.
https://www.ahd.com/state_statistics.html.
Barnet, Shannon, Molly Gamble, Heather Punke, Emily Rappleye, Ellie Rizzo, and
Tamara Rosin. "10 challenges and opportunities for hospitals in 2015." Becker's
Hospital Review. December 30, 2014. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/10challenges-and-opportunities-for-hospitals-in-2015.html.
Basu, S., J. Andrews, S. Kishore, R. Panjabi, and D. Stuckler. 2012. Comparative
performance of private and public healthcare systems in low- and middle-income
countries: A systematic review. PLoS Medicine 9 (6): e1001244.
Bernheim, S. M., J. N. Grady, Z. Lin, Y. Wang, Y. Wang, S. V. Savage, K. R. Bhat, et al.
2010. National patterns of risk-standardized mortality and readmission for acute
myocardial infarction and heart failure. update on publicly reported outcomes
measures based on the 2010 release. Circulation.Cardiovascular Quality and
Outcomes 3 (5) (Sep): 459-67.
Birkmeyer, John D., Andrea E. Siewers, Emily VA Finlayson, Therese A. Stukel, F. Lee
Lucas, Ida Batista, H. Gilbert Welch, and David E. Wennberg. 2002. Hospital

Su 65
volume and surgical mortality in the united states. New England Journal of
Medicine 346 (15): 1128-37.
Birkmeyer, John D., Therese A. Stukel, Andrea E. Siewers, Philip P. Goodney, David E.
Wennberg, and F. Lee Lucas. 2003. Surgeon volume and operative mortality in the
united states. New England Journal of Medicine 349 (22): 2117-27.
Bloom, Nicholas, Carol Propper, Stephan Seiler, and John Van Reenen. 2015. The impact
of competition on management quality: Evidence from public hospitals. The Review
of Economic Studies 82 (2): 457-89.
Brekke, Kurt Richard, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume. 2014. Can competition
reduce quality? .
Chang, Victor, Robert H. Blackwell, Ryan M. Yau, Stephanie Besser, Joslyn M.
Albright, Gopal N. Gupta, Paul C. Kuo, and Anai N. Kothari. 2016. Variable
surgical outcomes after hospital consolidation: Implications for local health care
delivery. Surgery.
Comondore, V. R., P. J. Devereaux, Q. Zhou, S. B. Stone, J. W. Busse, N. C. Ravindran,
K. E. Burns, et al. 2009. Quality of care in for-profit and not-for-profit nursing
homes: Systematic review and meta-analysis. BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 339 (Aug
4): b2732.
"Congressional Budget Office." Congressional Budget Office. March 09, 2017. Accessed
March 10, 2017. https://www.cbo.gov/.
Connor, R. A., R. D. Feldman, B. E. Dowd, and T. A. Radcliff. 1997. Which types of
hospital mergers save consumers money? Health Affairs (Project Hope) 16 (6)
(Nov-Dec): 62-74.
Cookson, Richard, Mauro Laudicella, and Paolo Li Donni. 2013. Does hospital
competition harm equity? evidence from the english national health service. Journal
of Health Economics 32 (2): 410-22.
Cubanski Juliette, Christina Swoope, Cristina Boccuti, Gretchen Jacobson, Giselle
Casillas, Shannon Griffin, and Tricia Neuman. "A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts
About the Medicare Program and the People it Covers - How much does Medicare
spend, and how does current spending compare to past trends and the future
outlook?" Kff.org. March 20, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2017. http://kff.org/reportsection/a-primer-on-medicare-how-much-does-medicare-spend/.

Su 66
Curfman, Gregory, MD. "Everywhere, hospitals are merging - but why should you care?"
Harvard Health Blog. April 01, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/everywhere-hospitals-are-merging-but-whyshould-you-care-201504017844.
Dafny, Leemore. 2014. Hospital industry consolidation—still more to come? New
England Journal of Medicine 370 (3): 198-9.
Dafny, Leemore S. 2005. Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application
to Hospital Mergers.
Dafny, Leemore, Kate Ho, and Robin S. Lee. 2016. The Price Effects of Cross-Market
Hospital Mergers.
Dranove, David, and Richard Lindrooth. 2003. Hospital consolidation and costs: Another
look at the evidence. Journal of Health Economics 22 (6): 983-97.
Drevs, Florian, Dieter K. Tscheulin, and Jörg Lindenmeier. 2014. Do patient perceptions
vary with ownership status? A study of nonprofit, for-profit, and public hospital
patients. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 43 (1): 164-84.
Ferrier, Gary D., and Vivian G. Valdmanis. 2004. Do mergers improve hospital
productivity? Journal of the Operational Research Society 55 (10): 1071-80.
"FINAL 2012 POLICY, PAYMENT CHANGES FOR HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT
DEPARTMENTS." Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. May 17, 2013.
Accessed March 10, 2017.
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2011-FactSheets-Items/2011-11-01.html.
Flodgren, Gerd, Martin P. Eccles, Sasha Shepperd, Anthony Scott, Elena Parmelli, and
Fiona R. Beyer. 2011. An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of
financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient
outcomes. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 7 (7).
Frakt, Austin B. 2015. Hospital consolidation isn’t the key to lowering costs and raising
quality. Jama 313 (4): 345-.
Gai, Yunwei. 2016. Evaluation of willingness-to-pay methods for pre-merger
investigation and certificate of need licensing in local hospital markets.

Su 67
Gaynor, Martin, Mauro Laudicella, and Carol Propper. 2012. Can governments do it
better? merger mania and hospital outcomes in the english NHS. Journal of Health
Economics 31 (3): 528-43.
Gaynor, Martin, and Robert Town. 2012. The impact of hospital consolidation–
update. The Synthesis Project. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
http://www.Rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261.
Gaynor, M., R. Moreno-Serra, and C. Propper. 2012. Can competition improve outcomes
in UK health care? lessons from the past two decades. Journal of Health Services
Research & Policy 17 Suppl 1 (Jan): 49-54.
Girotra, S., P. Cram, and I. Popescu. 2012. Patient satisfaction at america's lowest
performing hospitals. Circulation.Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes 5 (3)
(May): 365-72.
Glickman, S. W., W. Boulding, M. Manary, R. Staelin, M. T. Roe, R. J. Wolosin, E. M.
Ohman, E. D. Peterson, and K. A. Schulman. 2010. Patient satisfaction and its
relationship with clinical quality and inpatient mortality in acute myocardial
infarction. Circulation.Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes 3 (2) (Mar): 188-95.
Gorodeski, Eiran Z., Randall C. Starling, and Eugene H. Blackstone. 2010. Are all
readmissions bad readmissions? New England Journal of Medicine 363 (3): 297-8.
Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town. 2013. Mergers when prices are
negotiated: Evidence from the hospital industry.
Griffey, Richard T., and Joshua M. Kosowsky. "Cms/joint Commission Hospital Quality
Measures—is It the Federal Grade for Quality?." Emergency Medicine Reports 28,
no. 19 (2007): 225-235.
Guerin-Calvert, Margaret E., Jen Maki, and Bruce C. Vladeck. 2015. Re-aligning
prospective hospital merger guidance: Moving beyond concentration to more
meaningful approaches. Available at SSRN 2593165.
Harris II, J., H. Ozgen, and Y. Ozcan. 2000. Do mergers enhance the performance of
hospital efficiency? Journal of the Operational Research Society 51 (7): 801-11.
Hayford, Tamara B. 2012. The impact of hospital mergers on treatment intensity and
health outcomes. Health Services Research 47 (3pt1): 1008-29.

Su 68
"HCAHPS Fact Sheet." HCAHPS Hospital Survey. June 2015. Accessed March 10,
2017. http://www.hcahpsonline.org/Facts.aspx.
"HCAHPS Hospital Survey." HCAHPS Hospital Survey. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://www.hcahpsonline.org/.
"Health Care Spending as a Percentage of GDP." The Commonwealth Fund. Accessed
March 10, 2017. http://www.commonwealthfund.org/interactives-and-data/chartcart/chartbook/multinational-comparisons-data-2014/health-care-spending-as-apercentage-of-gdp.
Heidenreich, Paul A., Anju Sahay, John R. Kapoor, Michael X. Pham, and Barry Massie.
2010. Divergent trends in survival and readmission following a hospitalization for
heart failure in the veterans affairs health care system 2002 to 2006. Journal of the
American College of Cardiology 56 (5): 362-8.
Himmelstein, David U., Dan Ariely, and Steffie Woolhandler. 2014. Pay-forperformance: Toxic to quality? insights from behavioral economics. International
Journal of Health Services 44 (2): 203-14.
Ho, Vivian, and Barton H. Hamilton. 2000. Hospital mergers and acquisitions: Does
market consolidation harm patients? Journal of Health Economics 19 (5): 767-91.
Horwitz, J. R. 2005. Making profits and providing care: Comparing nonprofit, for-profit,
and government hospitals. Health Affairs (Project Hope) 24 (3) (May-Jun): 790-801.
Isaac, Thomas, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Paul D. Cleary, and Bruce E. Landon. 2010. The
relationship between patients' perception of care and measures of hospital quality
and safety. Health Services Research 45 (4): 1024-40.
"JCAHO Specifications Manual for National Hospital Quality Measures." QualityNet Specifications Manual. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?cid=1141662756099&pagename=QnetPubli
c%2FPage%2FQnetTier2&c=Page. Accessed 2%2F16%2F217.
Jha, Ashish K., E. John Orav, Jie Zheng, and Arnold M. Epstein. 2008. Patients'
perception of hospital care in the united states. New England Journal of
Medicine 359 (18): 1921-31.
Johar, Meliyanni, and Elizabeth Savage. 2014. Do mergers benefit patients in
underperforming administrations? lessons from area health service
amalgamation. Economic Record 90 (291): 526-35.

Su 69
Joynt, Karen E., and Ashish K. Jha. 2012. Thirty-day readmissions—truth and
consequences. New England Journal of Medicine 366 (15): 1366-9.
"Key Features of the Affordable Care Act ." HHS.gov. January 30, 2017. Accessed
March 10, 2017. http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/key-features-ofaca/index.html.
Kim, Kyung Hoon, Kang Sik Kim, Dong Yul Kim, Jong Ho Kim, and Suk Hou Kang.
2008. Brand equity in hospital marketing. Journal of Business Research 61 (1): 7582.
Kizer, Kenneth W. 2003. The volume–outcome conundrum. New England Journal of
Medicine 349 (22): 2159-61.
Krabbe-Alkemade, YJFM, TLCM Groot, and M. Lindeboom. 2016. Competition in the
dutch hospital sector: An analysis of health care volume and cost. The European
Journal of Health Economics: 1-15.
Krumholz, Harlan M., Zhenqiu Lin, Patricia S. Keenan, Jersey Chen, Joseph S. Ross,
Elizabeth E. Drye, Susannah M. Bernheim, Yun Wang, Elizabeth H. Bradley, and
Lein F. Han. 2013. Relationship between hospital readmission and mortality rates for
patients hospitalized with acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, or
pneumonia. Jama 309 (6): 587-93.
Krumholz, H. M., S. L. Normand, and Y. Wang. 2014. Trends in hospitalizations and
outcomes for acute cardiovascular disease and stroke, 1999-2011. Circulation 130
(12) (Sep 16): 966-75.
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Minette E. Drumwright, and Bridgette M. Braig. 2004. The
effect of corporate social responsibility on customer donations to corporatesupported nonprofits. Journal of Marketing 68 (4): 16-32.
Lynk, William J. 1995. The creation of economic efficiencies in hospital
mergers. Journal of Health Economics 14 (5): 507-30.
Martin, A., MD Makary, and Johns Hopkins. 2015. The potential hazards of hospital
consolidation implications for quality, access, and price.
McClellan, Mark B., and Douglas O. Staiger. 2000. Comparing hospital quality at forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals. In The changing hospital industry: Comparing
for-profit and not-for-profit institutions., 93-112University of Chicago Press.

Su 70
McIlvennan, C. K., Z. J. Eapen, and L. A. Allen. 2015. Hospital readmissions reduction
program. Circulation 131 (20) (May 19): 1796-803.
"Measurement Framework: Evaluating Efficiency Across Patient-Focused Episodes of
Care ." NQF. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2010/01/Measurement_Framework__Eval
uating_Efficiency_Across_Patient-Focused_Episodes_of_Care.aspx.
Narcı, Hacer Özgen, Yasar A. Ozcan, İsmet Şahin, Menderes Tarcan, and Mustafa Narcı.
2015. An examination of competition and efficiency for hospital industry in
turkey. Health Care Management Science 18 (4): 407-18.
"NHE Fact Sheet." Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. December 02, 2016.
Accessed March 10, 2017. http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-FactSheet.html.
Pan, Jay, Xuezheng Qin, Qian Li, Joseph P. Messina, and Paul L. Delamater. 2015. Does
hospital competition improve health care delivery in china? China Economic
Review 33 : 179-99.
Ramirez, Edith. 2014. Antitrust enforcement in health Care—Controlling costs,
improving quality. New England Journal of Medicine 371 (24): 2245-7.
"Readmissions Reduction Program." Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. April
18, 2016. Accessed March 10, 2017. https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-feefor-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html.
Schlesinger, Mark, Shannon Mitchell, and Bradford H. Gray. 2004. Restoring public
legitimacy to the nonprofit sector: A survey experiment using descriptions of
nonprofit ownership. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33 (4): 673-710.
Schlesinger, M., S. Mitchell, and B. H. Gray. 2004. Public expectations of nonprofit and
for-profit ownership in american medicine: Clarifications and implications. Health
Affairs (Project Hope) 23 (6) (Nov-Dec): 181-91.
Scott, Anthony, Peter Sivey, Driss Ait Ouakrim, Lisa Willenberg, Lucio Naccarella, John
Furler, and Doris Young. 2011. The effect of financial incentives on the quality of
health care provided by primary care physicians. The Cochrane Library.

Su 71
Sloan, Frank A., Gabriel A. Picone, Donald H. Taylor, and Shin-Yi Chou. 2001. Hospital
ownership and cost and quality of care: Is there a dime’s worth of
difference? Journal of Health Economics 20 (1): 1-21.
Sloan, F. A., J. Ostermann, and C. J. Conover. 2003. Antecedents of hospital ownership
conversions, mergers, and closures. Inquiry : A Journal of Medical Care
Organization, Provision and Financing 40 (1) (Spring): 39-56.
Squires, David, and Chloe Anderson. "U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective." The
Commonwealth Fund. October 08, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2017.
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-healthcare-from-a-global-perspective.
Suter, Lisa G., Shu-Xia Li, Jacqueline N. Grady, Zhenqiu Lin, Yongfei Wang, Kanchana
R. Bhat, Dima Turkmani, Steven B. Spivack, Peter K. Lindenauer, and Angela R.
Merrill. 2014. National patterns of risk-standardized mortality and readmission after
hospitalization for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia: Update
on publicly reported outcomes measures based on the 2013 release. Journal of
General Internal Medicine 29 (10): 1333-40.
Taylor, Zachary. "Health Care Spending Hits Record 17.5% Of GDP." David Stockman's
Contra Corner. December 03, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2017.
http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/thanks-obamacare-health-care-spendinghits-record-17-5-of-gdp/.
Tsai, Thomas C., and Ashish K. Jha. 2014. Hospital consolidation, competition, and
quality: Is bigger necessarily better? Jama 312 (1): 29-30.
Tsai, T. C., E. J. Orav, and A. K. Jha. 2015. Patient satisfaction and quality of surgical
care in US hospitals. Annals of Surgery 261 (1) (Jan): 2-8.
Weil, T. 2010. Hospital mergers: A panacea? Journal of Health Services Research &
Policy 15 (4) (Oct): 251-3.
Werner, Rachel M., L. Elizabeth Goldman, and R. Adams Dudley. 2008. Comparison of
change in quality of care between safety-net and non–safety-net hospitals. Jama 299
(18): 2180-7.
Xu, Tim, Albert W. Wu, and Martin A. Makary. 2015. The potential hazards of hospital
consolidation: Implications for quality, access, and price. Jama 314 (13): 1337-8.

Su 72
Yanci, J., M. Wolford, and P. Young. "What hospital executives should be considering in
hospital mergers and acquisitions." Charlotte, NC: Dixon Hughes Goodman
LLP (2013): 3.

Su 73
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
HEALTHCARE GROWS AS A SHARE OF GDP

(Taylor, 2015)

Su 74
APPENDIX B
HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL SPENDING
IN 2016

www.cbo.gov

Su 75
APPENDIX C
HEALTHCARE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1980-2012

www.commonwealthfund.org

Su 76
APPENDIX D
MEDICARE SPENDING AND PERCENT OF FEDERAL OUTLAYS AND GDP,
2010-2025

(Cubanski et al., 2015)

